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While campaigning for reelection in 2012, President Barack Obama gave a speech
in which he uttered the sentence “If you’ve got a business, you didn’t build that.” In the
aftermath of the speech, the phrase “you didn’t build that” circulated widely in political
discourse, generating a variety of responses from campaigns and commentators as to
what the phrase means. This thesis uses a posthuman rhetorical framework to investigate
how “you didn’t build that” influenced and was transformed by political discourse
systems. Specifically, I synthesize scholarship on complex systems, enthymeme, and new
materialism to argue that the ambiguity of the phrase enables individuals to draw
inferences capable of destabilizing discourse systems, and that from such disruptions
emerge responses that work to (re)stabilize those systems. In particular, I analyze a
response from the Obama campaign, articles written by political commentators, and the
“You didn’t build that” Wikipedia page in order to consider the rhetorical activity
generated by the phrase. Ultimately, this thesis argues that treating sites of analysis as
momentarily stable can provide a productive means of investigating the complexity of

rhetorical movement. I also maintain that seemingly divisive arguments can indicate
subtle yet significant changes in political discourse.
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CHAPTER I
BUILDING A RHETORICAL FRAMEWORK
TO INVESTIGATE “YOU DIDN’T
BUILD THAT”
On July 13, 2012, while campaigning in Roanoke, Virginia, for reelection,
President Barack Obama gave a speech where he espoused the importance of government
investment and criticized economic policies that cut taxes for the wealthiest Americans.
While making the case for the interdependent relationship between individuals, private
enterprise, and government, Obama said:
If you were successful, somebody along the line gave you some help.
There was a great teacher somewhere in your life. Somebody helped to
create this unbelievable American system that we have that allowed you to
thrive. Somebody invested in roads and bridges. If you’ve got a business –
you didn’t build that. Somebody else made that happen. (“Remarks”)
In the aftermath of the speech, the sentence “If you’ve got a business – you didn’t build
that” circulated widely in political discourse. At a campaign stop in Pennsylvania on July
17, for example, Republican nominee Mitt Romney claimed the President was suggesting
that Henry Ford hadn’t built Ford Motor Company and that Steve Jobs hadn’t built
Apple. Romney noted, “To say something like that, it’s not just foolishness. It’s insulting
to every entrepreneur, every innovator in America” (qtd. in Blake). The Romney
1

campaign also posted a video on its website that featured a loop of the President saying,
“If you’ve got a business – you didn’t build that.” In turn, the Obama campaign released
a video of the President maintaining that his words were taken out of context (Kiely).
Additionally, a host of political commentators sought to clarify, interpret, and otherwise
extend the situation surrounding the phrase “you didn’t build that,” what I refer to in this
thesis as an example of a “textual fragment.”
Many responses—from the campaigns and the commentators—used the concept
of context in their attempts to explain, what they claimed to be, the meaning of the
President’s statement and to respond to the way the Romney campaign framed the textual
fragment. What exactly constituted the “appropriate” context was a matter of debate, but
for the most part, context—as a concept—was associated with what Obama explicitly
said. Put another way, context was located within the text of the speech, and how his
words were represented influenced the supposed meaning of the textual fragment. For
instance, on its own, the sentence “If you have a business – you didn’t build that” implies
that the antecedent of “that” is “business,” encouraging an interpretation that the
President stated that business owners don’t build their businesses. The Obama campaign
claimed, however, that the President was referring to the bridges and roads he had
mentioned in the previous sentence (Kiely). Here, expanding the quotation by a single
sentence provides a wider textual context that may enable a different reading, as does
including the surrounding paragraph and the entire speech.
In these examples, context functions as a conceptual cornerstone, yet its meaning
is limited to the explicit words of the speech. This approach has its affordances; after all,
nobody wants to be misquoted. But it implies that context is stable and that a correct
2

reading of a text is possible. Such a conceptualization does little in the way of addressing
how a text can be simultaneously situated within myriad contexts that extend beyond the
confines of specific wording to generate a variety of meanings. Indeed, different
explanations of “you didn’t build that” suggest that a definition of context that only
considers quotation practices doesn’t account for how interpretations are influenced by
more than specific words delivered on a certain occasion. For instance, Michael
Smerconish, writing in a column published in The Huffington Post, moved beyond the
immediate context of the speech and argued that the President was echoing comments
made by Elizabeth Warren a year earlier when she was contemplating a run for the
United States Senate. Similarly, in The Washington Post, Glenn Kessler situated Obama’s
comments within a tradition that extends back to Franklin D. Roosevelt. And in The
Atlantic, Andrew Cline claimed that the President’s words undermined the conception of
America laid out by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence.
The rhetorical complexity of context underlies the project of this thesis, which
investigates the movement of “you didn’t build that” within and among political
discourse systems. This investigation is well served by posthuman rhetorical theory, as it
contests reductive understandings of context and meaning. Informed by complexity
theory, posthuman rhetorics reconceptualize rhetorical situation as a complex adaptive
system, which seeks stability by (re)organizing itself through feedback loops that
continually incorporate new, and often discordant, information into the system. Here,
autonomy, intentionality, and predictable effects are challenged and ongoing emergences
emanating from intra- and inter-acting heterogeneous elements are privileged (Hawk). In
such a framework, then, context and meaning can’t be stable because every rhetorical
3

situation—as well as the texts circulating within and comprising it—is necessarily
engaged in perpetual movement.
This instability is evident in the situation(s) surrounding “you didn’t build that.”
While an individual response may posit a certain sense of contextual stability that enables
a particular reading of the textual fragment, when considered together, the variety of
responses that claim to explain the meaning of the fragment suggests a dynamic
rhetorical situation that extended (and continues to extend) well beyond a campaign stop
held in Roanoke in 2012. But by framing the situation in a certain way, individual
responses evidence how the construction of boundaries can work to somewhat stabilize
the rhetorical situation and encourage a particular interpretation of the President’s words.
Put another way, specific responses to the textual fragment often posit stability, but
collectively they indicate that the situation is complex. As such, in this project, I examine
through a posthuman rhetorical framework the ways the textual fragment “you didn’t
build that” traveled within, influenced, and was transformed by systems of political
discourse. In particular, I look at how responses to the textual fragment can be considered
emergent, and I explore how the fragment and its various interpretations potentially
stabilize certain discourse systems while also opening them up to noise from other,
seemingly disparate systems.
In this project, the texts I analyze are specifically mentioned in the “You didn’t
build that” Wikipedia page.1 I chose this approach, for one, because the scope of the
project and the time allotted for completion necessitate a boundary, which the Wikipedia
page provides. But the page (and the site as a whole) also exemplifies the notion of
1

I capitalize “You” when referring to the Wikipedia page; otherwise, it’s written in lowercase.
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textual and systemic (in)stability this project seeks to investigate. From its use of
hyperlinks to ongoing page revisions to its including information from only “reliable
sources,” the page offers a rich site for further analyzing the interplay between movement
and stability. By examining texts referenced on the Wikipedia page as well as the page
itself, I attempt to emphasize the subtle, complex work involved in maintaining
seemingly stable systems.
The goal of this project, then, is to offer a call to those doing work in posthuman
rhetorics that analyzing specific texts doesn’t have to undercut posthumanism, but can
actually provide a productive means of investigating rhetorical movement. The following
research questions guide this project:


How might texts that posit stability actually indicate movement in complex
systems?



If texts can be considered as emergent effects of systemic interactions, how and
why may these texts also work to (re)establish stability?

Along with contributing to ongoing conversations in posthuman rhetorics, my project
seeks to understand whether political argumentation—often associated with a kind of
polarization and intransigence that hinders deliberative discourse—can actually evidence
the flow of information between political discourse systems. To this end, I also ask the
following:


How might arguments and beliefs that comprise a political discourse system
emerge from interactions with other seemingly disparate systems?



And how might political arguments indicate such systemic relationships?

5

Review of Literature
On their own, definitions for both posthumanism and rhetoric elude consensus, so
in situating this thesis in terms of posthuman rhetorical theory, I acknowledge that I’m
dealing with a framework that, perhaps fittingly, isn’t stable. From my perspective,
though, this framework’s baseline premise revolves around posthumanism’s decentering
of the liberal humanist subject and the rise of computer technologies and network
cultures, which requires a reconceptualization of the traditional notion of rhetorical
situation as comprised of a stable rhetor, audience, and message. This premise has been
informed by and taken up in a range of distinct yet often relating scholarship that
influenced this project.
In How We Became Posthuman, N. Katherine Hayles investigates and draws on a
history of cybernetics, informatics, and systems theories to put forth her
conceptualization of the posthuman subject. For Hayles, the “posthuman subject is an
amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity
whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction” (3). This
convergence of human and machine—an enmeshment that has always existed but is now
amplified by contemporary digital technologies—signifies that the concept of the
autonomous, liberal humanist subject is limited, as agency, consciousness, and action
occur within a network of human and nonhuman actors (3). It’s the scope of such a
project, in part, that leads Cary Wolfe to assert that “the nature of thought itself must
change if it is to be posthumanist” (xvi).
The question of what posthumanism means for rhetorical theory was brought to
the forefront by John Muckelbauer and Debra Hawhee when they suggested that
6

posthumanism’s consideration of human beings as “distributed entities rather than as
discrete processes” requires that rhetoricians rethink the stability often assigned to
rhetorical situation (768). As posthumanism as a field of study emerged from systems
sciences, it’s no surprise that complexity theory has informed how subsequent posthuman
rhetorical work has taken shape. In “Toward a Rhetoric of Network (Media) Culture,”
Byron Hawk extends the work of complexity theorist Mark Taylor in order to
reconceptualize rhetorical situation as a complex adaptive system (835). More recently,
rhetoricians have taken up complex systems theory to investigate a range of topics,
including enthymematic persuasion (Trader), explanation and description (Jung), and
rhetorical flow and blockage (Mays).
While complex systems theory is nuanced, the basic premise is that a system
adapts, or self-(re)organizes, based on the movement and intra-action of heterogeneous
elements within the system as well as the system’s interaction with elements previously
considered outside the system. This process of adaptation occurs via recursive feedback
loops that monitor the system and encourage stability. However, as Kristen Seas Trader
maintains, “[T]he same feedback loops that organize the system also hold it open to the
influence of the environment and other systems, allowing information to be exchanged in
both directions” (204). This tension between stability and instability regarding a system’s
boundaries echoes the work of social systems theorist Niklas Luhmann, who argues that
systems are simultaneously open and closed (Mays). But because some sense of a
boundary is necessary for a system to exist and meaning-making to occur, the “line”
between a system’s “inside” and “outside” is continually re-drawn in light of
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environmental changes, a process that leads Chris Mays to note that such boundaries are
rhetorical.
Because “outside” information interacting with the system is interpreted as
perturbations, a system reorganizes, i.e., adapts, in an attempt to maintain stability. In
doing so, it somewhat incorporates the outside information into the system. It’s this
process that encourages Trader to argue that posthuman rhetorics “engage in a parasitic
relationship with the tradition they seek to undermine” (206). In other words, posthuman
rhetorics privilege the perpetual movement of a system whose continual adaptation in
response to outside elements can’t help but reflect, in emergent ways, the influence of
those elements, now inside the system. It’s this idea of a complex adaptive system that
enables me to better conceptualize various instances of political commentary as effects
that emerged from seemingly outside elements (i.e., “you didn’t build that”) entering a
discursive system. In this framework, the textual fragment’s circulation in public
discourse encourages the proliferation of interpretations that work to stabilize their
respective systems, a process that often brings the fragment itself as well as competing
interpretations into those reorganizing systems, thereby enabling parasitic relationships to
occur.
Complex systems theory has a wide range of applications, but the call to re-think
rhetorical situation has also been taken up in scholarship that uses the metaphor of
ecologies. Work on rhetorical ecologies brings with it certain affordances, but also
important ethical considerations, namely the appropriation of a term used in indigenous
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and environmental rhetorics to emphasize relationships with the natural world.2
Appropriating and/or diluting the concept of ecology is a concern of mine, especially
since attending to the important ways digital technologies and individuals interact with
the natural environment is beyond the scope of my project; however, I find that
scholarship on rhetorical ecologies has positively influenced this project. Because of this,
I make connections between my project and the relevant research by translating the latter
into the register of complex systems in an attempt to avoid reductive metaphorical uses of
“ecology.”
In the seminal article “Unframing Models of Public Distribution,” Jenny Rice
advocates for an understanding of rhetoric based on movement, writing:
The rhetorical situation is part of what we might call . . . an ongoing social
flux. Situation bleeds into the concatenation of public interaction. Public
interactions bleed into wider social processes. The elements of rhetorical
situation simply bleed. (Edbauer 9)
Speaking against assumptions of stability, Rice argues that the concept of rhetorical
ecologies can productively emphasize rhetoric as a process emerging from and
circulating throughout interconnected affective networks. Such a framework is helpful as
it seeks to foreground how rhetoric isn’t contained to a specific place made up of

For instance, Gabriela Raquel Rìos uses land-based literacies and rhetorics to “shift the
ontological presuppositions inherent in the term ‘ecology,’” which to Rìos doesn’t quite denote
the literal kinship between people and the land she wishes to convey (64). And Matthew Ortoleva
argues that an ecological approach to rhetoric and composition can be used to effectively
emphasize the reciprocal relationship between discourse and the material, natural world, a
relationship that he claims is often foregrounded in environmental rhetorics (68). At the same
time, he warns that work using the metaphor of ecology often ignores or only indirectly alludes to
the natural world (68).
2
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exigencies and constraints identified by the rhetor. She writes that “a rhetoric emerges
already infected by the viral intensities that are circulating in the social field. Moreover,
this same rhetoric will go on to evolve in aparallel ways” (14). In this sense, rhetorical
effects always travel beyond a specific site through myriad networked connections,
therefore extending and transforming rhetoric in the process.
Nathaniel A. Rivers and Ryan P. Weber take up rhetorical ecologies as a way to
approach composition genres networked in public discourse, which they then apply to
public rhetorics scholarship and composition pedagogy. In doing so, they offer a way to
synthesize or perhaps re-converge work on rhetorical ecologies and complex systems.
The authors draw on Margaret Syverson, who argues that “an ecology is a kind of metacomplex system composed of interrelated and interdependent complex systems and their
environmental structures and processes” (qtd. in Rivers and Weber 192-93). Here, an
ecology can be used to situate a larger network of complex systems and help
conceptualize their interactions. This is also evident in Trader’s argument that rhetorics
“can be viewed as systems of theories with/in systems of discourse, which in turn are
enmeshed with/in cultural ecologies made up of not only discourse but material,
ideological, and affective elements as well” (205). Similarly, Mays presents rhetorical
ecologies as comprising a multitude of systems that “interact with each other in an
interconnected dynamic network. . . .” In this, rhetorical ecologies and complex systems
are used together to help account for the complexity inherent in the interplay of
heterogeneous elements at any given site of inquiry. However, situating systems within
ecologies doesn’t mean that ecologies must be used in this context. In fact, as Mays
points out, rhetorical ecological approaches are rooted in complex systems theories. And
10

Rivers and Weber make clear that Syverson’s use of ecologies doesn’t “move us up and
out of complex systems, but further down and through both their complexity and their
mundanity,” with the mundane signifying technologies and processes like pens and
publishing systems (192). For the authors, the affordance of a rhetorical ecology seems to
be that it lends itself to the role of the material in complex systems, as they view rhetoric
as “a bloody mess, a living thing, or . . . a confluence of many living things: an ecology”
(193). In this sense, a rhetorical ecology signifies the same thing as a complex system,
just at a different register.
It’s important to note that although complexity theory is often associated with
contemporary network culture, complex systems aren’t relegated to digital, discursive
spaces. Rather, as Hawk stresses, “[e]nvironment, rhetoric, texts, and audiences are
complex adaptive systems in themselves and together form other complex adaptive
systems. What we have are networks linked to other networks” (837). In other words,
complex systems can and do account for all intra- and inter-acting elements, including the
material. With this in mind, scholarship on rhetorical ecologies can be translated into a
complex systems register without reducing that research. In fact, Rice’s notion that
rhetorical situations “bleed” can be productively extended by considering how systemic
boundaries attempt to regulate rhetorical flow.
The movement of texts is also taken up by rhetoricians who don’t work through a
complex systems and/or ecological framework. Rebecca Dingo analyzes the transnational
flow and subsequent transformation of feminist discourse across local and global spaces.
Mary Queen tracks how representations of women circulate and transform when digital
texts are linked through different “fields of rhetorical action” (474). Stephanie Vie
11

analyzes how social networking technologies enable the transmission of visual memes.
And Jim Ridolfo and Dánielle Nicole DeVoss’ concept of rhetorical velocity extends the
canon of delivery to account for the ways that a writer’s text might be recomposed, or
remixed, by third-party sources in a viral economy.
In Still Life with Rhetoric, Laurie Gries draws on Rice’s work and takes up
dynamic rhetorical situations through a new materialist, visual rhetoric framework to help
account for and investigate the ways in which the Obama Hope image circulated through
various networks and means of distribution. For Gries, attention to the movement and
effects of nonhumans and humans that “assemble and intra-act in various collectives” is
paramount for rhetoric studies (12), arguing that “things must be studied as divergent,
unfolding becomings in order to account for their unique, distributed rhetorical ontology”
(19). In this sense, a thing becomes rhetorical through its movement and the subsequent,
perpetual effects it generates beyond its initial and obvious exigencies; therefore,
attending to the complexity of these effects is necessary. I find the aforementioned
scholarship on circulation helpful, and Gries’ emphasis that rhetoric needs to account for
an image’s perpetual transformations highlights that “you didn’t build that” did in fact
change and had myriad effects as it proliferated throughout political discourse.
Even though I acknowledge that texts are constantly in the process of becoming
something else and in many ways resist stability, in order to study anything, and by
extension investigate the rhetorical becomings that Gries discusses, a sense of stability is
required. Chris Mays sets out to “productively complicate the relationship of movement
and stability,” arguing through a “rhetoric-systems” framework that the concept of
“excess” is essential for conceptualizing flow and blockage in complex systems. Mays
12

notes the ways in which self-organizing systems “re-draw” their boundaries in order to
maintain stability in the face of perturbations. In particular, he conceptualizes
stubbornness as evidence of rhetorical movement. Additionally, by considering the ways
systemic boundaries are constructions, he asserts that for participants within a system,
that system is necessarily interpreted as a stable situation. In doing so, he challenges a
posthuman framework that negates stability and extends the conversation by advocating
for the paradoxical necessity of rhetoricians to treat situations as simultaneously stable
and in flux in order to analyze them. What I find helpful here is that Mays acknowledges
that a sense of stability is a necessary component of meaning-making. Treating the texts
I’ve selected as stable and dynamic enables me to rhetorically analyze them as emergent
and as circulating elements that contribute to other emergent effects. Considering the
“you didn’t build that” textual fragment and its various interpretations as momentarily
stable encourages a more complex analysis, an analysis that points toward and
presupposes a state of perpetual movement.
Methodological Framework
As discussed prior, this thesis is informed by a posthuman rhetorical theory that
reconceptualizes the traditional rhetorical situation as a complex adaptive system, a
system that constructs boundaries between itself and the outside environment through
perpetual feedback loops that also hold the system open to influence from “outside”
elements (Hawk; Trader). This view of rhetoric privileges systems as necessarily engaged
in perpetual motion via adaptation and therefore resisting stability. However, I will
supplement this with Chris Mays’ overarching rhetoric-systems framework, which
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“reveals that stability and movement are not opposed, but rather inseparable concepts
operating simultaneously in any situation.”
Although rhetoric-systems is the overarching framework, Kristen Seas Trader’s
belief that posthuman rhetorics are parasitic offers a way to consider how systemic
boundaries are contested. For Trader, this aspect of posthuman rhetorics is exemplified
by enthymeme, which she reconfigures as a kind of fluid feedback loop that allows a
system to adapt while also holding it “open to countless contingent, inferential
connections” (210). By bringing outside information inside the system, the system
reflects this parasitic relationship in emergent ways. She goes on to present enthymeme
as a “collaborative, inferential dynamic in discourse that weaves relationships among
what is explicitly stated and the implicit ideas, emotions, and experiences that help make
sense of a message” (210). Although he approaches it from a postmodern framework,
Matthew Jackson similarly takes up the instability of rhetorical situation and argues that
enthymeme can even be understood as “a piece of drifting discourse” (605). In this sense,
an argument could be made that all discourse is inherently enthymematic as inferences
are as unpredictable as they are inevitable.
Despite the slipperiness of such definitions of enthymeme, I value Trader’s
conceptualizing enthymematic assumptions (intentionally rendered or not) as systemic
feedback loops. In particular, she notes that “effective” enthymemes most often operate
in highly contextual discursive spaces largely informed by strict ideological coherence;
however, in the “low context communication that makes up the majority of networked
discourse today . . . such closure is . . . almost impossible” (211). In this sense, arguments
and beliefs conveyed through implicit assumptions can strengthen a more stringently
14

cohesive discourse system, but the perpetual onslaught of information in contemporary
society makes a 1-to-1 correspondence between implication and inference less likely, and
therefore the system is always vulnerable to inadvertently disruptive inferences. But as
systems strive for stability, it follows that they would attempt to minimize the risks
inherent in networked discourse.
To help ground Trader’s conception of enthymeme, I draw on Laurie Gries’ new
materialist, visual rhetorical framework. Gries argues:
Rhetoric is a distributed event that unfolds with time in and across
networks of complex, dynamic relations. At the heart of this process is
rhetorical transformation—a virtual-actual process of becoming in which
rhetoric unfolds in unpredictable, divergent, and inconsistent ways. (32)
She goes on to write, “While actual . . . pertains to an image’s concrete, physical
manifestation, virtual refers to an image’s undeterminable unique potential that is
immaterial yet not inconsequential” (37). This framework is essential because it allows
Gries to attend to a circulating image by drawing on Annemarie Mol’s concept of the
single multiple, thereby framing an image and its ensuing, and even divergent,
manifestations as “both one and many” (39).
Treating the textual fragment “you didn’t build that” as the single, I consider as
the multiple the varied responses that emerged as the fragment entered into seemingly
disparate political discourse systems. It’s important to note, though, that the “original”
textual fragment doesn’t exist as a static single and that its manifestations aren’t static
multiples; rather, the various actualizations, including the original utterance,
simultaneously act as one and many. In the context of partisan politics, and especially
15

presidential campaign season, when a fragment like “you didn’t build that” circulates in
discourse, it becomes quickly contested, i.e., interpreted in multiple ways. Gries writes,
“Despite such divergent actualizations . . . images such as Obama Hope maintain some
sense of wholeness, allowing us to recognize their presence in various actualizations and
account for their complex rhetorical life” (42). While she is discussing a visual image, a
similar move occurs with the textual fragment, if only because political commentators are
quick to assign explicit ownership to President Obama. Even those responses that claim
some interpretations have taken the textual fragment “out of context” still attribute the
phrase to him.
Similarly, although a visual image is involved in this “virtual-actual process of
becoming,” when placed in conversation with Trader’s enthymeme, it’s possible to see
the textual fragment as possessing the quality of the virtual in that it maintains a sense of
connection to Obama’s statement as well as the potential to generate multiple versions.
Because any piece of discourse, but certainly a contested one like “you didn’t build that,”
can evoke destabilizing inferences, the interpretations offered by the campaigns and
commentators can be seen as attempts at minimizing the fragment’s disruptive potential
by effectively filling in its enthymematic blanks. That is, by explicitly supplying the
alleged meaning of the textual fragment, political responses put forth versions of the
phrase more likely to be accepted by and stabilizing for their respective systems. In this
sense, the fragment’s “actual” can be conceptualized as the various responses that
emerged from and further expanded the fragment’s circulation.
Putting Gries and Trader into conversation provides a way to shape this project
within Mays’ overarching rhetoric-systems framework; however, a rhetoric-systems
16

methodology also helps me engage with Gries’ and Trader’ concepts. Gries and Trader
(amongst others) emphasize movement and circulation as a defining characteristic of
contemporary rhetorical theory and responsible rhetorical analysis, but Mays’ rhetoricsystems approach stresses the need for rhetoricians to “define things univocally, as
frozen, even as they are not. In order to describe flow one must suspend that very flow.”
He draws on Hayles (“Making”) to argue that this sense of stability occurs when an
observer inevitably makes a “cut” from the available information in order to generate
meaning of a rhetorical situation. Mays makes clear, however, that “[t]o take a rhetoricsystems approach is to recognize the ‘cuts’ we make, and to recognize the ways such cuts
create a paradox: stable systems are also inherently unstable.” Here, I acknowledge that
the texts I analyze are in a constant state of flux, containing, constructing, and
distributing divergent meanings; however, by simultaneously considering certain texts as
momentarily stable, I can productively consider the ways the texts contribute to and are
themselves evidence of systemic emergence.
I apply this framework to campaign and political commentator responses that take
up the textual fragment and were published prior to November 6, 2012 (Election Day). I
do so in order to analyze the effects the fragment had on political discourse systems in the
early stages of its circulation. Any attempt to categorize individuals or organizations
according to political ideology is going to be fraught, so I consider whether certain
interpretations take a generous or more critical stance regarding the President and the
textual fragment. Similarly, any given discourse system is comprised of a variety of
voices, but certain viewpoints carry more weight. I know that making generalizations
about discourse systems based on political ideology privileges certain individuals and
17

institutions over others and offers an incomplete and even reductive picture of those
politically engaged members of the American populace, but I feel that analyzing the
responses from more prominent voices and institutions within political systems will help
highlight how even those most polarized beliefs are influenced by systemic noise. When
analyzing these texts, I look for the ways that the authors invoke context and meaning in
order to legitimize their interpretations and maintain system stability.
The Site(s) of Analysis
For this project, I use sources mentioned in the August 28, 2015, version of the
“You didn’t build that” Wikipedia page. My initial exposure to the textual fragment
wasn’t through Wikipedia, but from my casually following campaign coverage leading
up to the 2012 election; however, when I started this project in August 2015, my reexposure to the issue was certainly influenced by Wikipedia (even before I knew which
direction I’d take the project). As such, any project on this topic would have reflected this
to varying degrees of transparency. My reliance on this site isn’t unique; the free, online,
open-source encyclopedia has steadily ranked in the top ten of most visited websites both
globally and within the United States. As such, I wanted to also analyze how Wikipedia
encourages a certain perspective on an issue.
Using a Wikipedia page as a boundary certainly brings with it affordances and
limitations. The “You didn’t build that” page provides me with a set amount of “reliable”
sources that I can analyze; however, I acknowledge that this ignores the vast majority of
individuals who took up and transformed “you didn’t build that” in their own ways. In
this sense, the page exists through a series of “cuts” that could have been made otherwise,
just as my using the page makes a certain cut that could have been made otherwise.
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Because of this, I don’t pretend to offer a full account of the textual fragment, but even
limitations have helped inform this project. As such, I’d like to provide an overview of
scholarship and conversations surrounding Wikipedia. To do so, I’ll discuss a couple key
features of wikis in general that will help ground how I approach the “You didn’t build
that” Wikipedia page.
A defining element of wikis is hypertextuality. In the 1960s, Theodor Nelson
defined hypertext as “non-sequential writing—text that branches and allows choices to
the reader, best read at an interactive screen” (qtd. in Landow 2-3). Much scholarship has
been written on the potential of computer-mediated hypertext to challenge both
traditional understandings of authorship and the linearity of texts (Bolter; Landow;
DeWitt; Johnson-Eilola and Hea; among others), and Angela M. Haas has further argued
that the revolutionary tone that can accompany scholarship on hypertext often privileges
Western notions of technological discovery and ignores indigenous multimedia
technologies, such as wampum belts. Haas writes that “[t]he organization of nodes and
links forms a nonlinear, or webbed, network of information in both wampum and
Western rhetorics” (87). And this webbed network is apparent in wikis, as users can
construct the way they encounter information by moving within and across hyperlinked
texts instead of following a path laid out by a single author. This emphasis on a nonlinear
reading experience informs my analysis of the “You didn’t build that” Wikipedia page
because it reminds me that despite the page’s seemingly straightforward structure, I
shouldn’t make assumptions as to how users encounter the information.
Susan Loudermilk Garza and Tommy Hern argue that an important aspect of
wikis is that by “[u]sing only a web browser, any number of users can quickly and easily
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create, access, and edit wiki pages, including those created by others.” The authors
maintain that this ongoing collaboration is key, and when coupled with the nonlinearity
of hypertext, it may be beneficial to consider a wiki as a process and not a product. By
their very nature, then, wikis subvert the traditional notion of texts as stable products.
The knowledge that anyone can edit the majority of pages (also known as
articles)3 found on Wikipedia has contributed to a sense of skepticism toward the website
in terms of credibility. Criticism often focuses on authorial knowledge (or alleged lack
thereof) but also the purposeful inclusion of incorrect information on a page, known as
vandalism. Marcus Messner and Marcia DiStaso argue that concerns over the veracity of
content on Wikipedia encouraged site administrators to tighten regulations for editor
contributions, including restricting access to certain pages as well as requiring editors to
either register with the site or have their IP addresses recorded (468). Wikipedia also
seeks to shore up issues of credibility through its three inter-related core content policies:
neutral point of view, verifiability, and no original research (“Wikipedia: Core”). These
principles revolve around Wikipedia’s intent to publish only information supported by
“reliable sources,” which are defined as “third-party, published sources with a reputation
for fact-checking and accuracy” (“Wikipedia: Identifying”). A component of this is the
attempt to give reliable sources their due weight: “Giving due weight and avoiding giving
undue weight mean that articles [read: pages] should not give minority views or aspects
as much of or as detailed a description as more widely held views or widely supported
aspects” (“Wikipedia: Neutral”). On this, Timothy Messer-Kruse, a professor at Bowling

3

Wikipedia refers to its pages as articles, and it considers an outside article from, say, The Wall
Street Journal as a source. Because my project deals with articles from a variety of online
websites, I refer to the “You didn’t build that” Wikipedia article as a webpage.
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Green State University, writes how he was prohibited from removing a widely held, but
from his perspective false, claim presented on the page for the Haymarket riots and trial
of 1886, even though this is the subject of his published scholarship. He was informed by
one of Wikipedia’s administrators that his corrections were reversed because they gave a
minority view undue weight over popular beliefs. Messer-Kruse claims he was told by an
editor that “Wikipedia is not ‘truth,’ Wikipedia is ‘verifiability’ of reliable sources.
Hence, if most secondary sources which are taken as reliable happen to repeat a flawed
account or description of something, Wikipedia will echo that” (qtd. in Messer-Kruse).
What I find relevant for my project is the self-sustaining relationship between reliable
sources and Wikipedia pages. Even though most anyone can edit a page, editors are
required to base information on sources generally considered to be reputable. This policy,
then, allows for democratization insomuch as it enables anyone with site access to decide
which viewpoints from already-privileged persons or media outlets they wish to draw
from.
Ridolfo and DeVoss’ concept of rhetorical velocity draws attention to the ways
existing information is transformed when it’s recomposed, or remixed. If we apply this to
Wikipedia, a specific edit on a page doesn’t simply convey how a subject was taken up in
a reliable source; rather, that entry reflects a necessary transformation of information as
it’s recomposed and often collaboratively revised in order to fit a different setting. This
element of collaboration leads the authors to argue that Wikipedia exemplifies
contemporary, networked culture where traditional notions of authorship and the
boundaries of texts can be questioned. In such a culture, “[i]nstead of a single author
producing solitary work in isolation and that work being attributed to that single, solitary
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author and delivered in a one-way fashion, we have distributed, shared views of
authorship” (Ridolfo and DeVoss).
Echoing the notion of distribution, Collin Brooke suggests that credibility
concerns facing Wikipedia due to its use of open-source collaboration emanate, in part,
from a narrow framework that ignores the “distributed credibility” at play in Wikipedia
(190). He argues that because the website provides access to each article’s revision
history and to discussion pages where debates over contributions take place, the site
presents credibility through the continual negotiation of content by editors. It’s this sense
of distribution that encourages Brooke to describe the site as a discourse system that
simultaneously “collects both the process and product of reference work” (191). Here, I
read reference work as the ongoing negotiation of editors to review what constitutes
content that meets the principles of neutrality, no original research, and verifiability. In
this, a page is a product because it presents a current version by default, but it’s also
perpetually engaged in a process of becoming something else through revision. Every
page, then, can be thought of in terms of a rhetoric-systems framework, in which “a
situation exists as a multiplicity of stabilities in the midst of constant change” (Mays).
In terms of the “You didn’t build that” page, Wikipedia’s emphasis on neutrality,
no original research, and verifiability requires that the page only provides information
supported by “reliable sources.” In doing so, the views of certain individuals are given a
platform for circulation not available to most, and some of these opinions are situated
within discourse systems explicitly labeled according to political ideology, i.e.,
“Conservative commentators” and “Liberal commentators.” The page’s structure, then,
encourages the notion that perspectives on a given issue can be partitioned according to
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political ideology, thereby facilitating a conception of the larger American political
system as stable or at the very least balanced. In this, the page somewhat minimizes the
textual fragment’s potential for enthymematic disruption by enabling individuals to
process responses to the phrase according to their beliefs regarding political discourse
systems and/or the sources information is based on.
It’s important to note that the page puts forth a plethora of different responses to
the textual fragment. This is evident in that there are sections devoted to both
conservative and liberal commentators, but also because nuance exists among responses
associated with the same political ideology. The page reflects, then, that the rhetorical
situation surrounding “you didn’t build that”—to borrow from Rice—bleeds well beyond
a campaign speech in Roanoke, subtly revealing that interpretations and the systems they
emerge from aren’t inherently stable, but result from rhetorical selections, or “cuts,” that
could have been made otherwise. Furthermore, all the information published on the page
has undergone some sort of transformation as it was recomposed from reliable sources. In
this sense, the page is comprised of a series of interpretations of reliable sources, which
are interpretations of the textual fragment in their own right. Specific entries, then, might
not encourage the same rhetorical effects in terms of enthymematic destabilization or
(re)stabilization as the sources they’re based on. This has to do with how they’re situated
in the page, but also the inevitable transformation that accompanies recomposition and
revision. As such, I use the concept of the single multiple to analyze the complex
relations between the textual fragment, reliable sources, specific entries, and the page in
general.
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I take the August 28, 2015, version of the “You didn’t build that” page as my
primary site of analysis, but I also examine the version from November 5, 2012, the latter
of which was the version available at the time of the election. By attending to two
versions, I’m able to foreground how Wikipedia’s available revision history presents the
page as both a product and a process, a text and a continually revised collection of texts
that are simultaneously stable and perpetually becoming something else. Furthermore, I
examine how the changes between the two versions indicate systemic adaptation.
Ultimately, then, while the Wikipedia page enables me to analyze a certain set of articles,
it also provides another site of analysis, in that the page continues to circulate and
transform the textual fragment.
With this in mind, I have somewhat divided Chapter 2 into two parts. The first
part features the aforementioned analysis of the “You didn’t build that” Wikipedia page.
Specifically, I examine how the page evidences the textual fragment’s complex rhetorical
becoming, and I investigate the ways the page can have (de)stabilizing effects on
Wikipedia users. In the latter half of the chapter, I use Mays’ rhetoric-systems
methodology to inform my analysis of “reliable sources” found through the more recent
“You didn’t build that” Wikipedia page. Framing the rhetorical situation as a complex
adaptive system, I investigate how political responses from individuals and organizations
can be considered emergent effects of the textual fragment’s systemic perturbations as
well as attempts to maintain system stability. I do so by drawing on Trader’s notion of
enthymeme to conceptualize the textual fragment as potentially evoking destabilizing
inferences, which the political responses both reflect and compensate for by making
specific interpretations available. In particular, I analyze a statement from the Obama
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campaign as well as political commentary from James Taranto in The Wall Street
Journal, Jennifer Rubin in The Washington Post, Andrew Cline in The Atlantic, and
Michael Cohen in The Guardian—all of which were published online. As these responses
transform the textual fragment but still maintain a distinguishable connection to Barack
Obama’s original utterance, I approach “you didn’t build that” as a single multiple. This
enables me to consider the textual fragment (which includes its various manifestations) as
both momentarily stable and indicative of rhetorical movement.
In the third and final chapter, I examine possible implications of this thesis for
rhetoric studies. In particular, I encourage those doing work in posthuman rhetorics to
attend to the ways context is used in popular and political discourses. I then discuss how
this project’s engagement with temporal complexities could impact how we
conceptualize rhetorical historiographic work. Finally, I consider how this thesis might be
productively extended through work in digital rhetorics.
Ultimately, it’s my hope that this project adds to and/or offers access to a
discussion concerning the subtle prevalence of connection, about how individuals, belief
systems, and technologies—from the most obvious and persuasive to those assumed to be
inconsequential—all play a role in shaping and continually changing what we understand
as life.
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CHAPTER II
SYSTEMIC NOISE
If my own experience is any indication, Wikipedia is a website where you can
start researching a particular subject only to find yourself hours later on a seemingly
unrelated topic, not quite sure how or why you arrived at this new page other than that
you followed a series of hyperlinks. Yet this nonlinear and in some ways unexpected
sense of movement associated with Wikipedia is facilitated by more than internal links.
With the site’s policy against “original research,” information presented on every page
ideally needs to come with an endnote citing the reliable source(s) on which the
information is based. Many of these endnotes include links to external websites, while
others signify offline source materials. Wikipedia even suggests that it is good practice
for users accessing the site for research to directly consult the reliable sources indicated
in the endnotes (“Wikipedia: Researching”), thereby encouraging individuals to leave the
page. In other words, whether it’s through hyperlinks or the acknowledgement that the
information offered “originated” elsewhere, every Wikipedia page is a complex network
that foregrounds myriad internal and external connections, challenging the notion that a
page is a stable text with definitive boundaries.
The “You didn’t build that” page may boast a level of complexity that I’ll only
scratch the surface of, but amidst the constant changes and almost endless potential for
networked connections, the page can paradoxically be read, albeit from a limited
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perspective, as momentarily stable considering that a particular version is published at a
given time.4 As such, the “You didn’t build that” page can refer to both a page in flux and
a specific version. It’s this duality that enables Wikipedia to be productively considered
as a product and a process (Brooke), a description analogous with Mays’ argument that a
rhetorical situation can “neither fully be characterized as frozen nor as flowing.” In this
sense, Wikipedia digitally embodies the dynamic interplay between movement and
stability associated with the observation of and participation in a situation.
More than just mirroring this dynamic, though, the “You didn’t build that” page is
material evidence of the fragment’s expanding rhetorical situation. With Wikipedia’s “no
original research” policy, for a page to come into existence in the first place, it’s
necessary for an issue to have traveled enough to have been taken up by reliable sources
and for Wikipedia editors to have then based entries on those sources. In other words, the
“You didn’t build that” page could only ever exist because “elements of rhetorical
situation simply bleed” (Edbauer 9). As such, the textual fragment and the page don’t
exist as discrete entities; rather, the page is an actualization of certain associations the
phrase has entered (and continues to enter) into. In this sense, each revision is an instance
of the fragment’s ongoing rhetorical becoming.

4

As of January 13, 2016, there were 100 links throughout the Wikipedia site that directed users to
the “You didn’t build that” page, which itself contained 492 links that would take users away
from the page. Furthermore, as of the aforementioned date, 128 editors had been involved in the
page’s 454 revisions. While I take as my primary site of analysis the version of the page that
existed on August 28, 2015, I mention the January 13, 2016, statistics for two reasons. The first is
that they were “currently” available in the page’s “Revision history statistics” tab as I began
drafting this section. But more importantly, these statistics highlight how the page became
something else multiple times throughout my project.
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Attending to such complexity necessitates a certain paradoxical degree of
stability. Mays notes that “a rhetorician must freeze a rhetorical situation in order to
successfully analyze it.” Adopting a rhetoric-systems approach, we can freeze a particular
page in order to investigate the complex relations that contribute to that version’s
emergence. Through such an analysis, I consider how the “You didn’t build that” page
extends a dynamic rhetorical situation through necessarily divergent rhetorical activity
that transforms the fragment in myriad ways. I then analyze the page as a complex system
comprised of smaller complex systems in order to consider the potentially (de)stabilizing
effects that digital “cuts” can have on Wikipedia users who might identify as participants
within conservative or liberal political discourse systems. By then attending to two
instantiations of the page as product, I provide a glimpse of the page as process,
highlighting how the construction of certain boundaries facilitates alternate and equally
legitimate readings of the page and the textual fragment. With this investigation, I
ultimately hope to offer a closer look at how the subtle yet consequential interplay
between stability and movement contributes to an issue’s rhetorical life, especially in
terms of how seemingly stable systems—whether it’s a Wikipedia page or a particular
rhetorical situation—could have been and are becoming otherwise.
Although all situations are dynamic and all Wikipedia pages involve complex
rhetorical activity, the textual fragment’s potential to generate a variety of inferences
capable of destabilizing various discourse systems makes it particularly noteworthy. This
capacity to evoke inferences warrants consideration as to how the fragment functions as
enthymeme. Trader argues that traditional definitions of enthymeme describe it as “the
efficient use of unstated commonplaces to reach an intended conclusion” (211).
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However, this efficiency is unlikely in the “majority of networked discourse” because
“the diversity of discourses, ideologies, and experiences create myriad inferential ‘gaps’
in any discursive system” (211). From a posthuman perspective, an inefficient
enthymeme can actually “destabilize the coherence of an ideological discourse that seeks
to exclude difference” by encouraging diverse assumptions (211). Drawing on Trader’s
work, I argue that “you didn’t build that” acts as an inefficient enthymeme. This is the
case not only because the fragment exists in networked discourse(s), but also because of
its ambiguity. Indeed, in Roanoke, Virginia, President Obama said:
If you were successful, somebody along the line gave you some help.
There was a great teacher somewhere in your life. Somebody helped to
create this unbelievable American system that we have that allowed you to
thrive. Somebody invested in roads and bridges. If you’ve got a business –
you didn’t build that. Somebody else made that happen. (“Remarks”)
This passage may elicit questions regarding who is included in the President’s use of
“you,” as well as who is—and who is not—implicated by his use of “somebody else.”
For our purposes, if we reduce some of the uncertainty and assume “you didn’t build
that” means “[business owners] didn’t build that,” the syntactic ambiguity concerning the
antecedent of “that” still increases the possibility that divergent inferences could disrupt a
sense of ideological cohesion circulating within each political discourse system. This
isn’t to say that assumptions will necessarily or even likely break from ideological
alignment; however, the enthymematic inefficiency of “you didn’t build that” makes it
harder for even ideologically cohesive inferences to be drawn with unequivocal certainty.
For instance, it wouldn’t be surprising if a supporter of the President found his words
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uncontroversial, i.e., that the President meant “business owners” didn’t build “roads and
bridges,” whereas a critic of the President found it controversial, i.e., that “you” didn’t
build “your business.” Both of these individuals would be making assumptions that align
with and therefore stabilize their discourse systems’ conceptions of the President.
However, the disruptive potential of the textual fragment isn’t that it lends itself to
polarized readings by participants in disparate discourse systems, as that would indicate a
certain enthymematic efficiency; instead, the phrase’s ambiguity makes it so that
individuals from both systems can identify with and be susceptible to myriad inferences.
The acknowledgement that another interpretation is plausible—even if it’s
disregarded—is significant. The textual fragment as inefficient enthymeme brings
discordant noises inside both systems, thereby infiltrating boundaries to “engage in a
parasitic relationship” with the dominant ideology (Trader 206). If a supporter of the
President maintains that Obama was referring to infrastructure or critiquing the notion of
autonomous innovation by commenting on the interdependent relationship between
people, government investment, and private enterprise, the phrase still possesses the
potential—in part through its ambiguous wording—to evoke a pang of sorts that the
President was being disrespectful to business owners. Similarly, a critic of the President
may maintain that the textual fragment reveals the President’s hostility toward private
enterprise, but the idea that individuals don’t build roads, bridges, or even businesses in
and of themselves can also fester. This provides an exigency—consciously recognized or
not—for campaigns and commentators to suppress the disruptive assumptions generated
by the textual fragment. By supplying specific interpretations that will (re)stabilize their
“own” discourse systems, they essentially work to complete the textual fragment as
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enthymeme by making explicit what would otherwise be unstated inferences. The
plethora of interpretations provided and the fact that these political responses often
contest one another contribute to the phrase’s circulation, including how it materializes in
Wikipedia.
Extending a Dynamic Situation
In this section, I investigate how the “You didn’t build that” Wikipedia page
evidences the circulation of the textual fragment such that it extends an already dynamic
rhetorical situation. If we adopt a rhetoric-systems approach and momentarily freeze the
“You didn’t build that” page from August 28, 2015, it’s possible to interpret it in such a
way that contests a simplistic understanding of rhetorical situation. For instance, the page
describes certain effects the textual fragment has had in the world. The page begins:
“You didn’t build that” is a phrase from an election campaign speech
delivered by President of the United States Barack Obama on July 13,
2012, in Roanoke, Virginia. The phrase was publicized by his political
opponents, and it has been described as a meme.
From a posthuman rhetorical framework, even these simple introductory sentences
indicate that while the textual fragment was first uttered at a campaign stop, it became
rhetorically consequential, in part, through its circulation in political discourse.
The page’s layout further emphasizes how the fragment was taken up in divergent
ways and experienced a sense of rhetorical becoming that extended well beyond Obama’s
campaign stop. The layout includes a quick overview of the topic, an interactive
“Contents” menu, and three main sections titled: “Background,” “Speech,” and
“Response,” with “Response” containing the subsections: “Conservative commentators,”
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“Liberal commentators,” “Fact checking organizations,” “Comedic commentators,”
“Romney campaign,” and “Obama campaign.” Although the page-as-product is
comprised of all the entries, the majority of the content is found within the overarching
“Response” section. And by including responses to the phrase that were diverse enough
to be split into six different subsections, the page suggests that the textual fragment’s
rhetorical life isn’t contained within the traditionally conceived rhetorical situation that
was the President’s speech in Roanoke.
At a glance, the page’s depiction of the phrase’s circulation seems to evidence
Gries’ conception of rhetoric as a “distributed event that unfolds with time in and across
networks of complex, dynamic relations” (32). It’s the very complexity of such relations
that challenges approaching the page simply as a distinct representation of a situation. As
the page emerges from the fragment having entered into diverse associations, it exists as
both an effect of and component in the fragment’s rhetorical life—a life that continually
extends its dynamic situation. Investigating certain relations in the “You didn’t build
that” page, then, offers a better understanding of this complexity.
The concept of the single multiple can help us attend to the rhetorical unfolding of
the textual fragment by framing reliable sources and the Wikipedia page as actualized
versions of “you didn’t build that.” As I mentioned in the previous chapter, Gries takes
up the concept of the single multiple to account for an image’s rhetorical complexity. She
argues that images like the Mona Lisa and Obama Hope manifest in a variety of versions
that “maintain some sense of wholeness,” enabling them to be identified as part of those
images’ distributed events (42). In this sense, political responses—whether from
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campaigns or commentators—that take up the textual fragment transform it, generating
different yet connected versions of it. Gries also notes:
[A]s images actualize in different versions via their relations, they become
more rhetorically consequential, or meaningful, in divergent ways. These
consequences are multitudinous in and of themselves, begin to take on
lives of their own, and stimulate more rhetorical activity. (45)
Here, I read “divergent” as signifying the complex and unexpected things texts do as
they’re taken up in the world. In this sense, the single multiple helps maintain a common
thread in a text’s rhetorical unfolding and directs our attention to instances where
divergences essentially touch down in actualized versions and generate effects.
If we consider a political response as an actualized version of the textual
fragment, we can recognize Wikipedia editors creating entries for the “You didn’t build
that” page as part of those versions’ rhetorical consequences. Furthermore, creating an
entry based on a reliable source is itself an instance where the textual fragment
transforms yet again since each entry on the webpage is ultimately an interpretation of a
reliable source (which is an interpretation of the textual fragment). Because entries are
then subject to further revision by the Wikipedia community, the page evidences how
rhetorical activity leads to more activity, with the editors’ practices producing subsequent
versions of the textual fragment. As such, analyzing these relations shows how the page’s
participation in the textual fragment’s rhetorical life necessarily entails it being the
consequence of divergent rhetorical activity as well as a catalyst for further
consequences.
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A subtle yet important instance of a particular entry transforming the textual
fragment can be identified in the “Background” section of the “You didn’t build that”
page published on August 28, 2015. The “Background” section focuses on a speech
Elizabeth Warren gave a year earlier while she was contemplating a run for the United
States Senate. After providing a quotation of Warren’s “fiery defense of progressive
economic theory,” the page states that “Obama later echoed Warren’s thoughts when he
spoke in Roanoke, Virginia, about how private businesses rely on government investment
in infrastructure.” This statement is verified by two endnote citations, but on closer
inspection, it’s not the reliable sources so much as the way they’re taken up in this
specific entry that shapes the textual fragment.
On the Wikipedia page, the word “echo” is the linchpin situating Obama and the
textual fragment within the same tradition as Warren’s “progressive economic theory.”
One of the reliable sources, an article written by Mark Trumbull in The Christian Science
Monitor, states that Warren is “someone linked to President Obama’s controversial ‘you
didn’t build that’ line about private sector business people” and that “[t]he theme that
America is about ‘we’ as well as ‘I’ is a longstanding one for Obama, but his comment
also echoed notes that Warren has been hitting.” In this case, the use of “echo” enables
Trumbull to comment on and circulate a belief in the alleged association between the two
speeches even if definitive evidence isn’t provided. But by acknowledging that Obama
himself had previously taken up these ideas, the connection to Warren can just as easily
be interpreted as their messages being in alignment rather than Warren’s somewhat
producing Obama’s. The other article, written by Kevin Robillard and published in
Politico, reports that Warren’s opponent in her subsequent Senate race, Scott Brown,
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claimed Obama’s speech was directly informed by Warren (the article’s headline is
“Brown: Obama echoed Warren”). This article certainly connects the two speeches, but
through a political rival’s allegation.
Analyzing the cited sources verifies the use of “echo” in this specific entry, but it
also shows that the page’s depicting the textual fragment as essentially the progeny of
Warren’s speech hinges on the use of a word that “originally” signified a more tenuous
connection. While “echo” still denotes a certain ambiguous link, the assertion that
“Obama later echoed Warren’s thoughts when he spoke in Roanoke, Virginia” is reifying,
especially because it is the essential pillar for the entire “Background” section. As such,
the version of the textual fragment actualized via the page is enmeshed with “progressive
economic theory,” thereby transforming the phrase and influencing how it’s interpreted
by participants in various political discourse systems. This brings us to how, from a
complex systems perspective, even the “same” actualized version of the textual fragment
can generate different effects.
The (De)Stabilizing Effects of Digital Boundaries
While in the previous section I discussed how the “You didn’t build that”
Wikipedia page emerges from and extends the textual fragment’s rhetorical life, in this
section, I adopt a complex systems perspective in order to take a closer look at how an
actualized version of the page—and the textual fragment—can variously stabilize or
destabilize readers’ conceptions of themselves and their discourse systems. For instance,
the August 28, 2015, version of the “You didn’t build that” page sections off the political
commentators according to two ideological labels: conservative and liberal. As complex
systems are both comprised of smaller systems and constitute larger ones (Hawk; Trader;
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Rivers and Weber), we can interpret the page’s “Conservative commentators” and
“Liberal commentators” sections as discourse systems that make up the overarching
political discourse system. In this sense, the section headings serve as digital boundaries
between smaller systems and their surrounding environment. I mentioned earlier that the
page’s layout indicates that the fragment’s effects extend beyond a particular campaign
stop; here, a complex systems perspective reveals that the page’s layout can influence
how the textual fragment is processed depending on how closely we zoom in.
Because the page features an array of political reactions to the fragment, it makes
sense that a reader invested in liberal or conservative discourse may look to
interpretations more likely to reaffirm his particular worldview. Without section
headings, he would likely have a harder time with this because he would have to sift
through an influx of information offered by the Wikipedia page, processing each entry on
a case-by-case basis (I discuss the absence of such headings further in the next section of
this thesis). The page’s framing information according to political ideology, on the other
hand, can be stabilizing for a reader because it somewhat insulates those sections from
information that’s “outside” each of the smaller discourse systems but still “inside” the
overarching one. The presence of conservative and liberal sections suggests a sense of
ideological cohesion at the more local level, theoretically reducing the “myriad inferential
‘gaps’” in the discourse system (Trader 211). In this sense, the textual fragment’s
capacity for enthymematic disruption is lessened if, for example, an individual browsing
the page were to gravitate to the responses under a specific section heading in order to
process the fragment in alignment with a particular ideology. More specifically, someone
sympathetic to the President may focus on the liberal commentators in order to receive an
36

ideologically coherent interpretation of the fragment and/or reinforce a narrative that Mitt
Romney and conservative commentators take things out of context. Conversely, someone
more critical of the President may look to conservative commentary to verify his belief
that Obama is disrespectful toward private enterprise.
Any sense of ideological coherence (or lack thereof) found in the Wikipedia page
necessarily reflects the work of the editors as much as (if not more than) the reliable
sources themselves,5 but the illusion of legitimacy that accompanies the appearance of
these digital boundaries has effects. The section headings may frame content as belonging
to disparate discourse systems, but zooming in closer reveals nuanced interpretations. For
instance, while the majority of the reliable sources referenced in the “Conservative
commentators” section are described as taking a critical stance toward the President and
the textual fragment, the presence of divergent viewpoints is significant. Part of this
section reads:
In The Atlantic, Andrew Cline wrote that what Obama said was an
“enormous controversy—a philosophical rewriting of the American story”
. . . Earlier in the same publication, Clive Crook wrote that Obama’s
statements did not mean what his critics wrote they meant, but that the
caricature resonates due to it being recognizable as part of his theme of the
“rich aren’t paying their fair share.”

5

For instance, Michael Smerconish is listed as a liberal commentator despite the fact that he had
been a registered Republican for 30 years before officially dropping his party affiliation in 2010,
upon which he claimed that he didn’t feel comfortable in either party (“For”). The Wikipedia
entry expresses Smerconish’s belief that the Romney campaign took the President’s statement out
of context. This criticism, as well as his column being published in The Huffington Post, may be
enough to flag him as a “Liberal commentator.”
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Here, I’d like to focus on Crook’s comments and what I see as their disruptive potential.
Somewhat hidden in the heart of the “Conservative commentators” section, the presence
of an alleged conservative commentator’s belief that “Obama’s statements did not mean
what his critics wrote they meant” undercuts the messages of other commentators within
this section. The page’s structure may encourage the perception that the conservative
discourse system is essentially partitioned from environmental perturbations, but as
Crook’s entry indicates, discordant noise exists on the inside of this digitally constructed
boundary. As such, a reader looking to the “Conservative commentators” section for a
unified explanation of the President’s statement may not have found it since the chance
for ideological cohesion is disrupted by someone situated within the conservative
discourse system. Without that coherence, the enthymematic potential of the fragment
could, in theory, be left un-cauterized, enabling a disruptive line of questioning for a
reader: If “you didn’t build that” doesn’t mean what those in my discourse system claim
it means, what does it mean? Why is there discrepancy? Such fleeting and not even
consciously realized questions can affect a reader through the possible emergence of
destabilizing inferences—inferences that may begin with the fragment’s grammatical
ambiguity but are amplified by a lack of coherent ideological interpretations.
The effects of such ideological discrepancies aren’t relegated to those whose
beliefs might otherwise align with conservative discourse. The availability of conflicting
interpretations within the “Conservative commentators” section could also destabilize the
conservative discourse system’s boundary as it’s rhetorically constructed by an outside
observer, such as someone who considers herself aligned with liberal discourse and who
assumes that conservatives would take a predictably critical or reductive stance on the
38

President’s statement. Here, the inclusion of Crook’s comments challenges the view that
those on the other side of the political spectrum are in lockstep on every issue. Processing
Crook’s alleged views on the textual fragment destabilizes the rhetorical boundary
between these discourse systems and encourages it to be re-drawn.
It should be noted, though, that the content attributed to Crook can be processed
in a way that renders it less disruptive. Mays argues that “we often react to destabilizing
information not by immediately changing our worldview, but by reorganizing it,
compensating for this information in such a way that keeps our overall view of the world
relatively intact.” He refers to this reorganization—this maintaining of systemic
boundaries in the face of new information—as a rhetorical rationalization. In this case,
the page acknowledges that Crook’s statements were published in The Atlantic, so his
comments that challenge other conservative commentators can be rationalized as coming
from a media organization that may have a liberal bias or doesn’t publish “real”
conservative views; therefore, his criticisms are more easily dismissed as not really being
a part of the conservative discourse system.
The response attributed to Glenn Kessler, situated within the “Conservative
commentators” section, is arguably more disruptive because his connection with a media
organization is less pronounced:
In The Washington Post, Jennifer Rubin wrote that the statement showed
that Obama “revealed a level of resentment toward the private sector that
was startling, even to his critics” . . . Glenn Kessler later said that the
Obama statement was taken out of context and that he was speaking about
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higher taxes for the wealthy, comparing individual initiative to the system
of many people working to create supporting infrastructure.
Here, Kessler is depicted as indirectly supporting Obama’s claim that his words were
taken out of context, which paints the Romney campaign and certain conservative
commentators as unfairly representing the President’s words. If Crook’s lack of
ideological alignment could be rationalized as coming from The Atlantic, the same could
certainly be true for Kessler, whose piece was published in The Washington Post, a news
outlet not exactly known for its conservative bent. However, the only indication of this
association, aside from the endnote citation and what could be found by linking to
Kessler’s “own” Wikipedia page, is the “later” in “Glenn Kessler later said.” This subtle
link between commentator and news organization encourages his comments to be read as
part of conservative discourse rather than identified as a node in The Washington Post’s
network, making it just a little harder to rationalize his criticism. This is ironic, as the
entry is taken from the “Fact Checker: The Truth Behind The Rhetoric” blog that Kessler
writes for The Washington Post.6 It’s entirely possible that his being placed within the
“Conservative commentators” section is a misrepresentation of Kessler’s political
leaning, but when such seemingly incongruent information is situated—accurately or
not—within a particular system, that system’s stability is threatened. To further consider

There is a lot I’d like to get into here—including the title of the column—but I especially find it
interesting that this information wasn’t included in the “Fact checking organizations” section.
Perhaps it’s because the section heading specifies organizations as opposed to columnists. This
uncertainty is an example of how extending this project to include a more robust look at the
revision history and talk pages—which showcase discussions between Wikipedia editors—would
be productive.
6
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the effects of these headings-as-systemic boundaries, it’s helpful to look at a version of
the page that hadn’t yet made such digital cuts.
“A Multiplicity of Stabilities”
The drawing of boundaries has effects on readers, who process such information
according to their understanding (consciously or not) of what these systemic boundaries
mean, but the “You didn’t build that” page’s digital cuts are made by Wikipedia editors
and are subject to further revision. Since the page is always in the process of changing,
it’s unproductive to claim that the most recent version is somehow the most legitimate or
“real.” Rather, it’s more useful to consider the page(s) and the ensuing actualizations of
the textual fragment as exemplifying the notion of a “multiplicity of stabilities in the
midst of constant change” (Mays). A given version may be uniquely accessed and treated
as stable in order to infer meaning from it, but the information conveyed isn’t definitive
since the page also exists in flux.
Changes in the page’s layout can significantly affect how information is
interpreted, even if specific entries don’t undergo extensive revisions. Unlike the August
28, 2015, version, the “You didn’t build that” page published on November 5, 2012,
didn’t make a distinction between conservative and liberal commentators.7 In the earlier
version, the political commentators were grouped under one section heading aptly titled,
“Political commentators.” From a complex systems perspective, instead of relying on
section headings as interpretive navigational tools, readers would have had to assess the
commentator, the organization, or the sentiment of the statement itself. This is certainly

To help differentiate between the two versions of the “You didn’t build that” page, I refer to the
version from November 5, 2012, in the past tense and the version from August 28, 2015, in the
present.
7
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feasible, but grouping all the political commentators into one overarching political
discourse system can make it difficult to process information. It’s this type of confusion
that encourages the construction of boundaries. Put another way: this scenario—
following Hayles and Mays—calls for a cut to be made. As Hayles notes, a cut “helps to
tame the noise of the world by introducing a distinction, which can be understood in its
elemental sense as a form, a boundary between inside and outside” (“Making” 71). If the
political commentators aren’t placed within particular systems, the “diversity of
discourses” that inhibits ideological coherence within the overarching system is amplified
(Trader 211). In this case, the section headings that exist in the August 28, 2015, page can
be interpreted as digital cuts that “tame the noise” of the earlier version.
Although the “Conservative commentators” and “Liberal commentators” section
headings construct boundaries and therefore make it easier to process information
according to political ideology, Kessler’s and Crook’s entries ironically become more
disruptive once these cuts have been made. The wording of Crook’s entry doesn’t change
across the two versions, and while Kessler’s entry is revised, both versions attribute to
him the same belief that President Obama was taken out of context. The entries’ potential
for destabilization increases, however, once they’re situated within the conservative
discourse system. Without the section headings, arguments that Obama was being treated
unfairly or that his words were taken out of context could be read by a participant in
conservative discourse as “noise of the world” because that participant might not
personally make a cut to include such information inside her own construction of the
conservative discourse system. In other words, the November 5, 2012, entries concerning
Crook and Kessler may not have been as disruptive to conservative discourse because
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they weren’t situated within that system, and a participant could have compensated for
their potentially destabilizing information by rationalizing them as biased, unfounded, or
simply ideologically other. Once the comments are explicitly placed inside a particular
system—as they were via the August 28, 2012, section headings—such a rhetorical
rationalization becomes more difficult.
Both versions of the “You didn’t build that” page rely on the textual fragment
being taken up in diverse ways and enable a recognition that with every revision the
rhetorical situation further extends beyond a campaign stop; however, the page does
actualize the situation’s dynamism in a seemingly stable manner, even with revisions
looming. When pages are understood by users as both products and processes, it’s
possible to acknowledge that these versions of the textual fragment are themselves in
flux. Differing versions—whether through the inclusion of certain section headings or
revised wording—indicate digital transformations of the page, but also facilitate an array
of readings of the textual fragment. Even a seemingly stable page, when analyzed at
different scales, can encourage a multitude of meanings. With the help of the single
multiple, the page can be traced backward through specific entries and reliable sources to
the President’s utterance. Doing so doesn’t hold the “original” version to a higher
standard; rather, it affirms that every node in this concatenation emerges from and
contributes to rhetorical activity, which influences how the textual fragment exists—and
what it does—in the world.
Even though the page generates a range of meanings concerning the textual
fragment, it does circulate particular reliable sources. The information based on these
sources is certainly taken up in divergent ways via Wikipedia entries, but the page
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provides access to the majority of these “original” articles. Analyzing these sources
doesn’t discount the rhetorical activity playing out in Wikipedia; instead, it offers a closer
look at systemic interactions that occurred as the single multiple textual fragment
circulated within political discourse, especially in terms of how discourse systems
compensated by simultaneously positing stability and evidencing movement.
Systemic Movement in Political Interaction
I’ve thus far discussed how the “You didn’t build that” Wikipedia page evidences
and influences aspects of the textual fragment’s rhetorical life—from the creation of
reliable sources to the composition and revision of entries based on those sources to the
(de)stabilizing effects the work of editors can have on readers. One catalyst for this
complex rhetorical activity is the generative potential of the textual fragment to
destabilize political discourse systems. By now zooming in on specific political responses
to the fragment, I analyze how they both emerge from and compensate for systemic
disruptions. In doing so, I consider the subtle effects political interactions have on the
systems and elements involved.
In a way, the argument that the contemporary American political system is
comprised of interacting elements is rather easy to make: a person or group does or says
something, and others respond. Even a perspective that identifies political discourse as
unproductive must acknowledge that the parties privy to a debate (very generously
defined) at least present their arguments, in part, via disagreement. In this sense, the issue
isn’t so much that the entities active in American governmental politics are disconnected
from one another; rather, the concern is that beliefs don’t seem to evolve through political
strife. The political discourse surrounding “you didn’t build that” certainly lends itself to
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such an interpretation. A posthuman rhetorical framework, however, helps us to identify
instances of systemic movement occurring in what might otherwise be considered an
unproductive situation. In particular, although seemingly rigid political responses may
work to quell nuance, through a rhetoric-systems approach, certain instances of partisan
conviction can help us paradoxically recognize a situation in flux. And while systemic
adaptations are not inherently positive or negative, they do provide us with an
opportunity to reconsider how we perceive political interaction.
Although campaigns and commentators attempt to delegitimize political
opponents and competing interpretations of the textual fragment, framing political
responses in terms of the single multiple helps foreground the connections between
versions as well as how these versions evidence the compensatory effects of systemic
interactions. Remembering that the textual fragment as inefficient enthymeme can
destabilize discourse systems by encouraging myriad inferences, political responses work
to suppress the enthymematic potential of “you didn’t build that” by actualizing
ideologically aligned interpretations of what the fragment really means. These actualized
versions of the single multiple textual fragment essentially complete the enthymeme by
stating the unsaid. By doing so, political actors minimize the likelihood that participants
in their discourse systems who encounter their responses will go on to draw assumptions
of their own. At the same time, by actualizing particular inferences, political responses
can increase the disruptive potential of the fragment for participants in other ideologically
aligned discourse systems. It’s when interpretations are presented as univocal, however,
that systemic movement can often be identified.
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Returning to the single multiple, we can frame the President’s utterance in
Roanoke, Virginia, as the “original” version of the textual fragment, complete with its
syntactic ambiguity. Then, on July 17, 2012, while at a campaign stop of his own, Mitt
Romney provided an interpretation of the President’s statement, saying, “[Obama] said
this, ‘If you’ve got a business, you didn’t build that. Somebody else made that happen.’
That somebody else is government, in his view” (qtd. in Kiely). Romney went on to note
that public employees and infrastructure are necessary for businesses to exist but that
people who work in government “did not build this business” (qtd. in Kiely). Here,
Romney acknowledges some sort of interdependent relationship between private
enterprise, government workers, and public services, but he ultimately asserts that the
meaning of the textual fragment is that the President believes businesses are built by the
government and not business owners. By actualizing an inference, Romney amplifies a
particular interpretation, one that’s stabilizing for a system supportive of him and that
fuels the textual fragment’s parasitic relationship with the discourse system supportive of
the President (Trader 206). Through this, Romney puts forth another version of the single
multiple textual fragment into political discourse, enabling us to think of “you didn’t
build that” as both the President’s utterance and the version put forth by Romney. And
because his version hadn’t yet been contested, Romney completes the textual fragment as
enthymeme without having to defend his version. In other words, he doesn’t address the
phrase’s ambiguity but presents his interpretation as a matter of fact.
Although Obama supporters may rationalize Romney’s comments as coming
from a political rival in the months preceding an election, the phrase’s syntactic
ambiguity has already laid the tracks for the destabilizing information to seep into the
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system. And the Obama campaign’s response indicates the disruptive potential of
Romney’s interpretation. On July 17, 2012, a component of the Obama campaign known
as the “Truth Team” posted a response on the campaign’s website contesting Romney’s
version of the textual fragment. Titled “Fact check: What President Obama actually said
about small businesses,” the post begins, “Mitt Romney is deliberately taking President
Obama’s words out of context in order to distort the President’s record of support for
small businesses.” The Truth Team offers a portion of Romney’s remarks, arguing that
the Republican nominee “decided to selectively edit” the President and completely distort
his message. After providing a longer quotation of Obama’s speech, the Truth Team
asserts that “[t]he President’s full remarks show that the ‘that’ in ‘you didn’t build that’
clearly refers to roads and bridges—public infrastructure we count on the government to
build and maintain.”
From a posthuman rhetorical framework, we can see that the campaign’s response
to the destabilizing potential of the textual fragment entails engaging with both the
President’s and Romney’s actualized versions. As such, the Truth Team’s response
features a double-move of sorts: it actualizes a new version of the textual fragment, and it
works to delegitimize Romney’s interpretation of the phrase. Framing “context” in terms
of text and claiming that the President “clearly” meant infrastructure helps persuade
readers that the meaning of the President’s statement is self-evident. In this sense, the
campaign’s positing a stable, “correct” version of “you didn’t build that” suppresses the
fragment’s enthymematic potential. That is, it reduces the likelihood that a reader in the
campaign’s discourse system will draw disruptive inferences on his own now that the
real meaning has been supplied.
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The campaign may allege the meaning of the textual fragment is clear when taken
“in context,” but it doesn’t exactly let the statement speak for itself; rather, it’s couched
with accusations of Romney’s dishonesty. The assertion that Romney reached his
interpretation through deliberately distorting and manipulating the President’s words
reinforces a narrative that the President’s political rival is unethical, which more or less
reinforces a ready-made rationalization that political rivals and the information they
provide should be dismissed. Perhaps more subtly, though, this move encourages the
suppression of any and all inferences that don’t align with the version put forth by the
Truth Team. For example, if Obama’s words are clear “in context” and they’re only
controversial through misrepresentation, then any uneasiness I may have must be the
result of my not knowing the whole context or my having been primed by Romney. It
essentially tries to persuade readers to make a campaign-sanctioned cut by framing all
other interpretations as the products of either ignorance or deceit. In this sense, the Truth
Team actualizes another version of the single multiple, one that supplies a way for
individuals to rhetorically rationalize Romney’s—and by extension their own—divergent
interpretations.
When James Taranto sought to vindicate Romney and put forth an interpretation
of the textual fragment unfavorable to the President, he directly refuted the Truth Team’s
version. On July 18, 2012, in an online opinion column for The Wall Street Journal,
Taranto argues that “[t]he president’s remark was a direct attack on the principle of
individual responsibility, the foundation of American freedom.” He also includes an
excerpt of the President’s speech, prefacing it by noting, “Here is the full context, as
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presented by the Truth Team.” Then, challenging the campaign’s assertion that the
President meant infrastructure, he writes:
That’s bunk, and not only because “business” is more proximate to the
pronoun “that” and therefore its more likely antecedent. The Truth Team’s
interpretation is ungrammatical. “Roads and bridges” is plural; “that” is
singular. . . . Barack Obama is supposed to be the World’s Greatest Orator,
the smartest man in the world. Yet his campaign asks us to believe he is
not even competent to construct a sentence.
In this, Taranto effectively takes the Obama campaign’s definition of context as being
textual and doubles down. Approaching the text on grammatical grounds enables Taranto
to claim that, in context, the meaning of “you didn’t build that” is clear, but that Obama
clearly meant “business” and not infrastructure. This works to reduce the likelihood that
participants in Taranto’s discourse system will draw disruptive inferences from the
fragment. Defining context in terms of text, then, encourages a grammatical reading that
supports the legitimacy of his version and paints the Truth Team as offering a dishonest
interpretation. It’s through this alleged textual stability that Taranto can stabilize his
worldview and discourse system.
Additionally, Taranto rationalizes his allegiance to grammar by facetiously
claiming that Obama “is supposed to be the World’s Greatest Orator, the smartest man in
the world.” Ironic though his rationale may be, it does provide a certain way for people to
compensate for claims that the President simply misspoke. Framing Obama as being
beyond grammatical mistakes stabilizes Taranto’s political discourse system even further.
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Here, I’m not focused on whether Taranto’s insistence on grammar is more or less
legitimate than the Obama campaign’s assertion that the President was “clearly
refer[ring] to roads and bridges.” Putting forth an interpretation and purporting that it’s
the absolute version can be problematic when it demonizes other perspectives and hinders
individuals from exploring other alternatives, thereby reducing the opportunity for beliefs
to evolve in certain ways unimpeded. The activity of the Obama campaign and Taranto
may evidence a dynamic situation, but by suppressing the enthymematic potential of the
textual fragment, they work to funnel rhetorical flow through ideologically regulated
pathways.
Albeit problematic, this doesn’t mean that these systems and the worldviews
circulating within them are static. A rhetoric-systems approach recognizes that even
something as potentially divisive as foregrounding the disingenuousness of political
opponents can be a way to compensate for perturbations made possible by flowing
information. Supplementing interpretations with rationalizations indicates an awareness
that those positions are contestable. This can be seen as a system working to “[resist]
slipping into its infinite other possible states by avoiding direct interaction with the
outside as much as possible” (Mays). In this case, avoiding direct interaction means
suppressing our inevitable tendency to draw inferences because they may disrupt
ideologically cohesive systemic boundaries. But although the aforementioned responses
work to insulate seemingly disparate discourse systems, they emerge from the everpresent potential for beliefs to become otherwise.
The presence of divisive rhetoric doesn’t signify complete systemic closures,
either. Both the Truth Team’s and Taranto’s responses entered political discourse not
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only as emergent effects of systemic interaction but also as feedback loops, helping to
construct and ideally stabilize their respective discourse systems. Remembering that an
important aspect of complex systems, though, is that “the same feedback loops that
organize the system also hold it open to the influence of the environment and other
systems,” these systems exist simultaneously as both closed and open (Trader 204). This
helps us take note of the information Taranto and the Truth Team inadvertently bring
within their respective systems via their actualizations of the single multiple textual
fragment.
For instance, by providing Romney’s “out of context” interpretation of the textual
fragment, the Truth Team includes a quotation of Romney making his allegation against
the President. Although it compensates for this information by framing Romney as
dishonest (and editing his comments), the campaign does reiterate an unfavorable
interpretation—one actualized by but not necessarily originating with Romney. Put
another way: the campaign brings noise from the environment within the system in order
to silence it, and in doing so, runs the risk of it reverberating.
Similarly, although Taranto ultimately refutes the Truth Team’s accusations
regarding context, the first portion of his column includes a quotation of Romney’s
remarks against the President as well as apparent evidence that the President is both
“God’s gift to comedy” and a threat to the “foundation of American freedom.” In
emphasizing Romney’s interpretation of the fragment as well as other instances where
Obama “revealed” his “objectionable” beliefs, Taranto’s column first reinforces
ideological opposition to Obama. It’s not until the latter portion of the column—once the
reader has been effectively ideologically primed—that Taranto takes up the Obama
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campaign’s allegations. By not leading off with the controversy, Taranto’s response
minimizes the risk in bringing outside information inside the system. Still, including the
statement “in context” in order to contest it does offer his readers a glimpse of the
President’s statement, potentially reigniting the very enthymematic inefficiency that
Taranto is working to quiet. If we follow Trader’s lead and take posthuman rhetorics as
parasitic, the question becomes how discourse systems and the individuals that comprise
them reflect the inclusion of such information—textual ambiguity, counterarguments,
rationalizations, and all.
Adaptations in (Divisive) Discourse
In the previous section, I argued that select responses put forth into political
discourse actualized versions of the single multiple textual fragment that refuted the
phrase’s syntactic ambiguity and claimed alternate interpretations were disingenuous. I’ll
now analyze how subsequent political responses indicate systems subtly adapting to the
inclusion of various instantiations of the textual fragment. Indeed, certain responses
moved away from arguments based on the President’s grammar. From a rhetoric-systems
perspective, this can indicate adaptations in those discourse systems. By examining these
actualized versions, we can identify compensatory changes and consider how, without
interpreting the fragment’s syntactic ambiguity with a sense of certainty, commentators
still worked to suppress its enthymematic potential and stabilize their own systems.
On July 24, 2012, in The Washington Post’s the “Right Turn” blog, Jennifer
Rubin—who offers “reported opinion from a conservative perspective”—took up the
issue of the textual fragment, writing:
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[When Obama] delivered up his “you didn’t build that” (whether it was
the infrastructure or the small business itself to which he was referring) he
revealed a level of resentment toward the private sector that was startling,
even to his critics.
Here, Rubin puts forth a version of the textual fragment that shares a basic premise with
the versions actualized by Romney and Taranto: that “you didn’t build that” signifies
President Obama’s disrespect for businesses. But whereas Taranto and the Obama
campaign’s Truth Team both engage the debate specifically at the sentence level, Rubin
somewhat sidesteps the syntactic ambiguity of the President’s phrasing by essentially
deeming that aspect of the conversation irrelevant. Instead, she suppresses the textual
fragment’s capacity to encourage destabilizing assumptions by supplying an overarching
interpretation void of ambiguity, in effect funneling disparate inferences into a unified
conclusion. In this sense, acknowledging differing opinions on what the President meant
to say paradoxically strengthens her argument by implying either that such minute
discrepancies don’t influence her larger point or that they both support it.
Rubin presents the ambiguity over the President’s intended referent as a
secondary issue, and placing it in parentheses only adds to the notion that the information
isn’t essential. But from a rhetoric-systems perspective, her including this assurance is
significant because it indicates an acknowledgment of and subsequent change from an
argument based on alleged sentence-level clarity. This isn’t to say that Rubin’s response
evolved directly from Taranto’s or the Truth Team’s, but such seemingly intransigent
debates over the antecedent of “that” generated subtle rhetorical effects. Rubin’s not
entering the conversation on that level, then, highlights an instance of systemic
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adaptation—namely that an argument based on grammatical fealty is contestable and
perhaps not an effective strategy in neutralizing the textual fragment-as-perturbation.
Just as Rubin doesn’t specify what the President referred to, she also doesn’t
specify whether, in her post, the textual fragment refers to the phrase or the speech.
Vaguely describing Obama’s “you didn’t build that” as a revelatory agent encourages
critics of the President to process this single multiple by drawing on their assumptions as
to who they think the President really is (and who he has been all along). She takes up the
issue of context by quoting Romney’s assertions that the “context is worse than the
quote” and that the President’s ideology is “very strange and in some respects, foreign to
the American experience type of philosophy” (qtd. in Rubin). By doing so, she associates
the speech with an evocation of Obama’s Otherness, and the textual fragment more or
less bleeds into the speech and the speech into a larger situation, which contains the
President’s alleged attacks on private enterprise and his “foreign” philosophy.
She only takes up “context” again at the end of her post, noting that the “Obama
people argue simultaneously that he was taken out of context and that his denigration of
individual effort is still valid.” In parentheses, she provides a quotation from Obama’s
speech, but it’s from a portion that preceded the textual fragment. Alluding to allegations
of context without providing the text immediately surrounding “you didn’t build that”
asks what information Rubin is circulating or not circulating via her post-as-feedback
loop. Not supplying the context-as-text as desired by the “Obama people,” Rubin
withholds potentially destabilizing information from a discourse system whose
participants she has just informed shouldn’t care whether the President meant
infrastructure or business. Aspects of her response may evidence systemic movement, but
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her post works to stabilize the system by using “you didn’t build that” to attract and
reinforce ideologically aligned assumptions concerning Obama in general. These macrolevel beliefs, then, suppress divergent noises emanating from the textual fragment, the
very perturbations parenthetically framed as inconsequential.
*

*

*

Andrew Cline similarly acknowledged the syntactic ambiguity of the textual
fragment in order to move beyond it, only his response drew heavily on the concept of
context-as-text. On August 10, 2012, Cline wrote an article for The Atlantic titled, “What
‘You Didn’t Build That’ Really Means—and Why Romney Can’t Explain it.” In it, he
claims that the reason the textual fragment remains prevalent in political discourse is
because “Obama made a shift so profound, but so easily misunderstood, that neither side
has been able to end the debate. . . .” With this, Cline posits that the conversation between
both discourse systems has been unproductive, and responsibility for this alleged
ineffectiveness rests not with either “side” but with the subtle magnitude of the
President’s words. His article, then, appears to address both liberals and conservatives,
providing them with the otherwise elusive explanation of what “you didn’t build that”
really means.
Cline supplies a large quotation from the President’s speech, one that includes the
textual fragment, “so there is no question about the context.” Immediately afterwards,
however, he isolates two sentences: “If you’ve got a business—you didn’t build that.
Somebody else made that happen,” stating, “Like any classic, it is just as good the
hundredth time as it was the first time. . . .” He then acknowledges the debate over the
phrasing, writing, “Let’s be charitable and take the White House at its word that the
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president meant to say ‘those’ and not ‘that,’” before asserting that “[e]ven by the most
favorable interpretation, the president uttered something worthy of enormous
controversy—a philosophical rewriting of the American story.”
Through a rhetoric-systems approach, we can identify instances of systemic
movement in the way Cline presents the textual fragment. Like Rubin, he foregrounds the
apparent ambiguity of the phrase, thereby acknowledging that a debate has been had and
that he’s moving beyond that discussion. But after legitimizing disparate sentence-level
readings, he goes a step further than Rubin by explicitly taking up the Obama campaign’s
preferred interpretation in his move to suppress the textual fragment’s enthymematic
potential. Presenting this as a charitable act—prefaced by his describing the controversial
sentences as “a classic”—signifies that this move is strategic and that he’s aligned with a
discourse system that’s more oppositional to the President. His assertion that even this
referent can’t alter the irrefutable meaning of Obama’s words works to stabilize his
argument and his discourse system.
Moving beyond sentence-level ambiguity and emphasizing the President’s “full
remarks” enable Cline to then pivot to that larger textual context. Alleging that “[w]ith
his Roanoke speech, Obama turned Jefferson on his head,” Cline blurs the line between
the textual fragment and the speech itself. He describes the textual fragment as the
“clincher” on Obama’s “radical” beliefs that the “[g]overnment is not dependent upon the
people; the people are dependent upon the government” and that the state has a “claim to
the wealth individual Americans created through their own initiative.” For support, Cline
doesn’t look to “you didn’t build that” but to different quotations from the President’s
speech. Defining context-as-text helps Cline situate the textual fragment within the larger
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context, not to explain the phrase, but to implicate it in his overarching interpretation.
“You didn’t build that” becomes a synecdoche, then, for the President’s “full remarks.”
In this sense, Cline actualizes another version of the textual fragment, one that
simultaneously signifies a line from the speech, the speech as a whole, and Obama’s
supposed worldview. Because of this, a refutation of the speech and Obama in general
suppresses the divergent potential of the fragment.
At one point in his argument, however, Cline writes:
Obama’s one nugget of a point—that infrastructure facilitates
commerce—is disputed by no one. Nor does any serious person dispute
that everyone should pay for that infrastructure or for the essential services
the people have tasked the government with providing. It is a
fundamentally American principle.
Although he frames it as a non-issue, from a rhetoric-systems perspective, this passage
can be read as a compensatory effect of arguments that frame the conservative position
on the textual fragment as absolutely opposed to infrastructure and taxation.8 Simply
needing to address this issue and set the record straight highlights an adaptation in the
system.
As this article moves within the political system, it serves as a feedback loop; like
any response that includes the “full remarks” of the President’s speech, it contains the
potential to reintroduce readers to divergent inferences generated by the textual fragment.
The article, though, most obviously circulates a version of the textual fragment where the

Cline’s insistence that “everyone” should pay for infrastructure subtly implies that every person,
regardless of his or her situation, should pay taxes. Whether it was his intent or not, “everyone”
doesn’t acknowledge financial circumstances.
8
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President’s beliefs are framed as “radical,” which works to stabilize a discourse system
critical of the President. But the article also includes simple and otherwise seemingly
uncontroversial acknowledgements that the antecedent of “that” could have been
infrastructure and that some public services are valuable. So while Cline stabilizes and
legitimizes a partisan reading of the President, he also evidences systemic movement.
Although his message may be more stabilizing for conservative discourse, the article’s
circulation in The Atlantic, coupled with his “charitable” reading of the textual fragment,
can generate widespread rhetorical effects and interact with liberal discourse—and the
overarching political system—in myriad ways.9
*

*

*

Not all responses attempt to explain the textual fragment by actualizing a version
based on what they believe the President really said or who he really is. For instance, the
theme of the second day of the Republican National Convention was “We Built It”
(Beard), and a rhetorical consequence of this somehow unironic actualization was an
opinion column published the following day, August 29, 2012, in The Guardian. Under
the headline “They build that: how a Republican lie turned into an alternate universe,”
Michael Cohen gives a brief overview of Obama’s campaign event in Virginia before
providing a passage from the President’s speech, one containing the textual fragment. He
thereafter describes this larger quotation as “all fairly boilerplate rhetoric—a basic
recitation of how Democrats view the role of government and its interplay with the

9

This is an instance where an approach grounded more in digital rhetorics could strengthen this
project. In addition to analyzing the article’s comment section, tracking its digital reach via social
networking sites could illuminate how and to whom it’s being circulated.

58

private sector.” But he notes that “like a famished dog with a new bone,” Republicans
grabbed onto the phrase “you didn’t build that.”
He continues, “That single phrase, taken out of context by Republicans, has
become the GOP’s symbol of Obama’s supposed contempt for the free market and
entrepreneurship, and for his socialist assault on America.” In this, Cohen provides an
interpretation of the textual fragment, one that works to stabilize a discourse system
supportive of the President; however, he doesn’t provide an explanation in terms of what
Obama meant, nor does he engage the textual specifics of the phrase. Rather, Cohen
encourages a reading of the passage as a single entity, something to be processed as a
whole, and by describing it as “boilerplate rhetoric” and a “basic recitation,” he frames
the information as not particularly noteworthy.
His subtle use of context—with the word “context” only mentioned the once, and
only after providing the quotation from the President’s speech—enables the textual
fragment to blend into its surroundings. “You didn’t build that” comes into existence, in
and of itself, once Republicans, like ravenous animals, take it out of context and
transform it into a “stand-in for all that is wrong with Obama.” Cohen’s actualized
version doesn’t so much complete the enthymeme as it rejects the legitimacy of the
premise. It’s telling that he claims Republicans latched onto “You didn’t build that” and
not “If you’ve got a business—you didn’t build that,” thereby distancing the textual
fragment from “business” and reducing the potential for divergent inferences. In this
sense, Cohen creates a single multiple textual fragment, but in his version, “you didn’t
build that” means Republican deceit.

59

This may seem like divisiveness, and in a way it certainly is. But through a
rhetoric-systems approach, we can consider Cohen’s presentation of the textual fragment
as itself a rhetorical effect. For instance, like Rubin and Cline, Cohen avoids arguments
based on textual clarity, but his participation in a disparate political discourse system
indicates that such systemic adaptation isn’t relegated to discourse critical of the
President.
A rhetoric-systems approach can also identify a subtler instance of systemic
adaptation. While the majority of his column is devoted to evidencing the extent to which
Republicans lie, toward the end, Cohen writes:
One can believe that government should play a less direct role in the
workings of the private economy—clearly, this is a defensible notion. But
to listen to Republicans harping on Obama’s “you didn’t build that” line is
to hear a party that views “government” in the most simplistic terms. This
isn’t a governing philosophy; it’s a caricature of how the economy
actually works.
To be sure, Cohen isn’t exactly softening his criticism of Republicans, but simply stating
that he’s not diametrically opposed to the notion that government may play a too-direct
role in the private economy is significant. Whether it’s frustration with the Republican’s
“alternate reality” or a compensation for his own partisan viewpoint, recognizing the
legitimacy of a basic conservative belief, i.e., that government is too involved in the
private sector, indicates a change in the system. And as this column serves as a feedback
loop for political—and particularly liberal—discourse, this compensation circulates,
indicating an opening for a debate about the size and role of government. Perhaps in
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Cohen’s mind, this isn’t possible while Republicans take an overly simplistic approach to
the conversation, but his response, like any single multiple, both emerges from and
generates a range of rhetorical effects.
Contextual Matters
In the previous examples, the concept of context is often presented in terms of
quotations from the President’s speech. That is, context is primarily textual. Including the
sentences that surround the textual fragment lends responses and their accompanying
discourse systems a sense of stability, an air of certainty. But we’ve seen how similar
approaches can facilitate disparate interpretations. The Obama campaign and Taranto
both focus on the specific phrasing, only to disagree on the President’s referent. Cohen
and Cline, on the other hand, both use context to draw attention away from “you didn’t
build that,” but what the former identifies as “boilerplate,” the latter believes to be a
“rewriting of the American story.” In these responses, context-as-text serves a
legitimizing function; it enables the commentators and the Obama campaign to
strategically present their arguments as if they don’t have anything to hide, confident
their interpretations won’t be derailed.
But if context-as-text appears to lend a response a certain degree of stability, such
an understanding risks ignoring how even the “same” phrase is interpreted through
ideological frameworks, whether it’s an assessment of the President as a person, a
judgement of his administration’s previous policies, or the belief that the Jeffersonian
concept of America is better left unevolved. This isn’t to discount interpretations on
grounds of ideology, but to recognize that the desire to have our worldview reinforced—
or at least to have it complicated on our own terms—is as powerful as it is subtle.
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Because of this, we chance seeing a comfortable framework not as a cut that could have
been and likely is being made otherwise, but as stable and unequivocal.
The comfort of stability works to erase how our interpretations are generated and
shaped by an unfolding rhetoric that circulates within, changes, and is changed by a
variety of frameworks. The strength of the aforementioned responses seems to be in the
refutation of alternate, competing versions, but what this approach doesn’t recognize is
that every reading is indebted not only to our own interpretive lenses, but also to the
rhetorical activity of those we interact with, including those we contest. But even if a
specific response or conversation frames context as textual in order to legitimize an
interpretation, we can remember that the words put forth aren’t necessarily stable.
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CHAPTER III
MOVING (FORWARD)
A rhetoric-systems approach calls attention to how an argument both generates
effects and is necessarily incomplete, and so it is with this thesis. Rather than outright
concluding, then, I’d like to open up this project by examining its possible implications
for rhetoric studies and suggesting ways it may be extended moving forward. To do so, I
first continue the conversation on context that ended the previous chapter, arguing that
the way context is used in popular and political discourses warrants attention by those
doing work in posthuman rhetorics. I then discuss how the temporal complexities
involved with conceptualizing rhetoric in terms of an ongoing event could impact
rhetorical historiographic work. Finally, I consider how the boundaries I’ve constructed
throughout this project might be productively re-drawn through work in digital rhetorics.
At the end of the previous chapter, I discussed how defining context as being
purely textual encourages accepting a preferred interpretation of a given text as
commonsensical rather than as a perspective shaped by a host of factors. While I
maintain that such an understanding of context is limited, contemporary rhetorical
scholarship should recognize that context is often understood in public discourses in
terms of a text’s explicit wording. Indeed, as a popular component in meaning-making,
the concept of context-as-text necessitates close rhetorical attention.
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Although context as a concept is taken up within contemporary rhetorical
scholarship, it’s often framed within conversations regarding the limitations of rhetorical
situation. For instance, drawing on work by posthumanist scholars such as Bruno Latour,
Richard Doyle, and Donna Haraway, J. Blake Scott presents a rhetorical-cultural
methodology that looks beyond a text’s immediate situation. He reconfigures contextual
influences as the interaction of human and nonhuman actors that create larger conditions
of possibility that contribute to a text’s emergence (354-55). Similarly, Trader argues that
engaging the complexity of events
require[s] that we draw on a more complex articulation of the current and
likely future conditions of our discursive interactions, as well as the
contexts where our communicative practices take place and our rhetorical
concepts must take into account. (202)
This necessary articulation entails examining these contexts as complex systems, an
approach I’ve adopted in this thesis. Trader also distinguishes between high and low
context communication, but they’re taken up in terms of ideologically coherent systems
and those with more permeable boundaries, respectively (211). And Rice makes a similar
claim when she positions “rhetorical publicness as a context of interaction,” which she
then frames as a “circulating ecology of effects, enactments, and events” (Edbauer 9).
Rice and Scott point out that traditional views of rhetorical situation can render
productive insights, but that such analyses are limited. Ultimately, when conceptualized
as influences on rhetorical situation, context is dismissed in favor of an understanding of
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rhetoric as an emergent effect and ongoing process of interaction.10 As this thesis
hopefully evidences, I agree with frameworks that privilege the interaction of elements,
but I now draw attention to what may be missed by posthuman and other contemporary
rhetorics that contest, dismiss, or even supplement understandings of context without also
attending to how it’s often used in popular and political discourses.
In the previous chapter, I argued that defining context as explicitly textual can
work to legitimize those political responses to the textual fragment that include an
appropriate excerpt from President Obama’s speech as well as delegitimize the validity of
interpretations that don’t. In this sense, providing the “full context” increases the
likelihood that such responses will be more stabilizing for their discourse systems,
because if context is limited to the speech’s text, arguments can be processed not as the
results of ideological cuts, but as explications of the textual fragment’s inherent meaning.
At the same time, however, this approach is used by individuals who disagree on the
phrase’s meaning, so while a rhetor’s allegiance to context-as-text may legitimize her
argument, by the same logic, it also enables competing interpretations to be put forth. As
such, context-as-text simultaneously facilitates the problem and the solution, because
when this definition of context is used to support multiple interpretations, the
proliferation of perspectives highlights how meaning is made by more than what can be
located within a given text. On some level, anyone who uses this definition of context in
his argument understands this; otherwise, there would be no need for an accompanying
explanation of what a selected text means. But if context-as-text paradoxically

10

The notion of a wider context is, however, sometimes used to encourage rhetoricians to
recognize the expanding scope of various networks at play in any site of analysis (e.g., Edbauer
13).
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foregrounds the very ambiguity that varied interpretations simultaneously seek to refute,
why is its use so pervasive, and what can be learned from it?
If we maintain that discourse is itself emergent, it’s possible to consider this
narrow understanding of context as itself an effect of the inherent instability in any
system and the inevitable ambiguity found in the assessment of any rhetorical event.
Perhaps the potential to interpret events otherwise calls for a common referent. Precisely
because meaning isn’t inherent in a text, both sides of an issue benefit from a shared
point of reference, something that each can use to anchor its argument. In other words,
even if context-as-text creates competition such that an argument’s purpose is to
challenge the validity of other interpretations, relying on this conceptualization of context
is still an important part of establishing that which is contested and therefore entering the
conversation. That the referent is a simple quotation is, admittedly, a low bar, but by
grounding themselves in a common concept, those who hold seemingly disparate
positions find a certain degree of stability through one another. In doing so, the
overarching political discourse system becomes more stabilized because those involved
are, for the most part, playing by a shared rule or at least an implicitly agreed upon
guideline.
Context-as-text fosters a multiplicity of competing perspectives. Although many
of these interpretations may be presented as unequivocal explanations of a text/event, it’s
possible to identify a certain mutual vulnerability within such collective, if paradoxical,
conviction, if only because the ever-present potential for events to become otherwise
induces cooperation on a shared point of reference. By attending to how context is
defined and what such definitions do, posthuman rhetorics can examine subtle instances
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of connection within and across seemingly discrete systems. This isn’t to say that every
argument that mentions context will conceptualize it the same way, but however it’s
defined deserves recognition, as it may provide an access point of sorts for better
understanding already complex interactions.
Temporal Complexity
Throughout this thesis, I’ve analyzed how and to what effects systems and
elements interact with one another. Within this has been a gesturing toward a certain
temporal complexity that can productively enter into conversation with scholarship on
rhetorical historiographic work. Indeed, I’ve taken a view of rhetoric as a distributed
event, where the textual fragment entered (and continues to enter) into diverse
associations; however, the complex rhetorical life of the textual fragment is beyond our
grasp. As Gries argues (in a way that aligns with Mays’ rhetoric-systems approach), an
event “can never be fully captured in our analyses and interpretations because an event is
a process of inexplicable becoming” (27). Inherent to this notion of becoming is a
complication of time as simple and linear. Gries notes that new materialist
conceptualizations of time are often informed by timescapes in contemporary online,
networked societies, where information appears to flow simultaneously and
instantaneously such that past and future collapse into an “eternal present” (30). With
such a collapse, “our messages seem . . . everywhere at once and nowhere in particular,”
thereby facilitating a view of rhetoric as a distributed event (31). At the same time,
rhetorics materialize and generate divergent effects. In this is the tension between a
present—a sense of being, even a multiplicity of beings—and a sense of becoming, of a
moving toward something else.
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This tension is evident in the single multiple textual fragment, where divergent
actualizations unfold and generate rhetorical activity at different rates of time such that
the overall distributed event of “you didn’t build that” has multiple temporal
configurations. But as an actualization, each version of the single multiple also comes
into being as an emergent effect of rhetorical activity. A value in a rhetoric-systems
approach is that it draws attention to the necessity and inevitability of freezing actualized
versions in order to analyze them and create meaning. In this sense, each single multiple
actualization is both frozen in our interpretations and involved in a temporal flux.
Analyzing the textual fragment’s transformations, as evidenced in its manifestations, can
point to its various, if partial, states of being as well as its process of becoming.
This sense of temporal complexity has implications for historiographic work. In
her work in Chicana feminist rhetorics, Jessica Enoch argues that recovering women’s
voices from spaces overlooked by dominant historical and rhetorical traditions can
sponsor marginalized rhetorics such that they challenge traditional understandings of
rhetorical criticism as well as mainstream feminist histories (13). By placing women’s
words and actions in their “immediate and most visible rhetorical situation” (13),
historians “not only acknowledge the fact that women spoke and identify the constraints
they overcame, but they also examine the specific methods that silenced women’s voices
at particular times and places” (17). This historical work generates effects, in part,
because it highlights rhetorical strategies used to “discount women’s claims—especially
marginalized women’s claims” (17).
An essential component of this historiographic work is situating women’s
rhetorics in their past contexts (here, context is understood in terms of rhetorical
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situation), which we can consider in light of the aforementioned temporal complexities
that accompany conceptualizing rhetoric as an act of becoming and being. Indeed, we can
examine the notion of recovery and contextualization to offer a perspective on what these
methods may entail. For instance, recovering a marginalized rhetoric could lend itself to a
project that starts with a rhetorician looking into the past to reconstruct an historical case.
From a posthuman perspective, on the other hand, we could consider women’s voices
that were silenced in one venue as still involved in a process of becoming. In this sense,
an historical rhetoric has always been an unfolding event and therefore transforming with
time. Recovery could be thought of as the intra- and inter-action of a marginalized
rhetoric, a rhetorical historiographer, and any other cultural systems she may be working
within and/or against. Importantly, a simplistic notion of recovery can be complicated
when the historiographer is a participant in a rhetorical event that may appear either
“historical” or “new” to those operating through a privileged frame. Here, the activity
isn’t an encounter between discrete entities but perhaps a rhetorician already working
within an underrepresented rhetoric and informed by an “historical” case to create spaces
for that intellectual tradition and therefore further resist and disrupt oppressive systems.
A rhetorician who isn’t a participant in such a tradition can ask not only how dominant
systems silence certain voices and how those systems can be challenged, but also how his
understanding of “recovery” work and the underrepresented rhetoric are influenced by
the very systems meant to be disrupted.
Rather than a rhetorician uncovering the past or a rhetoric moving toward the
future, from a posthuman perspective, various elements enter into association together.
To examine both the need for and conditions of historiographic work, we might ask how
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and why the intra- or inter-action of an “historical” case and a “contemporary”
rhetorician unfolds at a different rate and to different effects than other associations a
particular rhetoric has entered into. With this, we can complicate the notion that history is
brought to the present linearly and in a way that inherently signifies progress, as the
activity generated by a marginalized rhetoric’s complex relations with historiographic
work becomes another fold in its ongoing distributed event.
At the same time, what posthuman rhetorics that privilege emergence from the
interaction of elements can learn from historiographic work is the importance of strategic
and tactical interventions. Even if effects can’t be predicted, a rhetorician can
purposefully enter into an unfolding event such that there’s a likelihood for important
social justice work to emerge. Part of this process is identifying and contextualizing a
marginalized rhetoric. Situating women’s voices in a particular context is both necessary
for learning about their lives and their rhetorical activity as well as the systems involved
and strategies employed to silence them. Making such a cut enables a description of the
situation, but every historical situation existed in flux. A situation may be described as
previously being something, but a posthuman rhetorical perspective may ask what else
that situation was and was becoming. In other words, what was left outside the cut by
doing the important work of situating marginalized women’s rhetorics within their
particular historical and immediate contexts? In what ways do the reconstructions
involved with historiographic work breathe life into rhetoric but also imply a partial
understanding of the event?
The question of what effects an underrepresented women’s rhetoric had—and
continues to have—beyond a particular historical context is taken up by Enoch, who puts
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forth a feminist rhetorical historiographic tracking methodology, the key tenet of which is
to “resist historiographic closure at the initial or most visible rhetorical situation . . .”
(21). As such, Enoch encourages us to ask, “What else happened to this rhetoric? Who
else was listening? Who might have retold these [Chicana’s] stories and to what end?”
(21). In this, Enoch’s methodology productively enters into conversation with posthuman
rhetorics that privilege nonlinear rhetorical effects. In particular, questions concerning the
notion of “retelling” emerge from this interaction. For example, what are the implications
of any retelling? What transformations does the rhetoric go through as it “unfolds with
time in and across networks of complex, dynamic relations” (Gries 32)? How may
rhetorics diverge after a retelling?
I don’t know the answers to these questions, but I do know that an aspect of
Enoch’s work I value is her emphasis on survival. To me, survival suggests a sense of
resistance and overcoming such that the surviving rhetoric will have changed—and
continue to change—from its original manifestation to how it comes into a multiplicity of
beings in time. A rhetorical event can never be extinguished, but it can perhaps burn
brighter and in myriad ways when there are people committed to hearing voices and who
take them up strategically, tactically, and ethically. Thinking back to the concept of the
single multiple, we can recognize that nonlinear effects are both a part of the “original”
rhetoric’s life and engaged in a process of inevitable transformation, of being and
becoming otherwise. Rather than a dilution, that “historical” rhetoric exists in flux in the
present, entering into diverse associations that produce consequences and contribute to its
expanding life, perpetually generating multiple avenues for continued resistance and
survival.
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Digital Implications and Interventions
This thesis required certain selections. While enabling me to form and articulate
arguments, the boundaries I’ve constructed necessarily limited the scope of this project;
however, constraints can also suggest opportunities for future work. For example, one of
the most significant boundary lines I drew for this project was to focus on how the textual
fragment circulated in texts published on the Internet, thereby ignoring how “you didn’t
build that” was taken up outside these online spaces. Such an approach risks not only
discounting the vast majority of political activity that occurs in offline environments, but
also how online and offline activity interanimate one another. It also elides concerns
about who has access to Internet and other communicative technologies. Furthermore, by
analyzing a popular website in Wikipedia and the arguments of privileged voices backed
by established media outlets and political organizations, I’ve hardly looked to the
margins. The textual fragment no doubt entered into associations I haven’t even
considered, and examining how else it was taken up—in different spaces, in different
media, by different people—would certainly be productive. In this last chapter, however,
I’d like to specifically address and ask questions that emerged from the sites I did
analyze, especially in regards to how rhetorical activity may be strategically deployed to
facilitate systemic disruptions.
While I considered the movement of “you didn’t build that” as it manifested in
various versions, I didn’t address how these texts actually traveled. Scholarship in digital
rhetorics has attended to the circulation and ensuing transformation of texts as they enter
into various relations (e.g., Queen; Ridolfo and DeVoss; Vie). All the texts I analyzed
concerning the textual fragment were and are currently accessible online; therefore, the
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ability for people to share them on social networking sites, through personal
communications such as email, or in various online forums is worthy of consideration. In
light of this project’s emphasis on systemic interactions, I’m curious about the potential
for actualized texts to be brought within and disrupt various online communities.
While some online forums, comment sections, and social media threads may be
considered unproductive and even hostile discursive spaces, it’s possible to frame them
as complex systems in their own right. I wonder, then, how users may be able to bring
discordant information into these various spaces. For example, what would be the
nonlinear effects of posting in the comment section of Michael Cohen’s article from The
Guardian, and in that response, including a link to Andrew Cline’s article from The
Atlantic, or vice versa? This may seem like a tepid act, and in a way, it is. System
participants rhetorically rationalize potentially destabilizing information (Mays), and in
an article’s comment section, systemic boundaries may be guarded especially well. After
all, I don’t necessarily imagine that in the previous example a link would likely be
opened and the article read; however, even information that is quickly dismissed—
whether it’s the article’s content, the posted comment, or the presence of the link itself—
interacts with the system. In this sense, even something as seemingly ineffectual as
linking an article into a disparate online space does something. And if linking isn’t
considered to be enough, how might information from other sources be incorporated in a
post such that it has a greater likelihood of being accepted by participants in different
discourse systems/online communities?
This isn’t to suggest that information needs to or should “originate” from a
published article, but how arguments from outside texts are incorporated into another
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composition asks for a closer look. As mentioned in the first chapter, the notion of
“recomposition” is taken up by Ridolfo and DeVoss. In “Composing for Recomposition:
Rhetorical Velocity and Delivery,” the authors put forth the concept of rhetorical velocity
to extend the traditional notion of rhetorical delivery. In particular, they urge attention be
paid to the ways a writer’s text might be recomposed by third-party sources as it
circulates, and that this consideration can inform how authors, in turn, compose. The
authors also note that the concept of rhetorical velocity can facilitate an analysis that
“attempts to understand what has happened in instances of rhetorical delivery by initial
authors and by third parties.” In other words, rhetorical velocity focuses attention on what
happens, especially what transformations occur, when authors take up texts.
As discussed in Chapter 2, a certain transformation occurs in Wikipedia whenever
reliable sources are recomposed and revised as entries. Here, I’m interested in how this
may indicate opportunities for systemic disruption as well as complicate Wikipedia’s
relationship to dominant beliefs. From a certain angle, I see the website’s policies on
reliable sources and on “not [giving] minority views or aspects as much of or as detailed
a description as more widely held views or widely supported aspects” as further
amplifying already privileged voices (“Wikipedia: Neutral”). In this sense, the distributed
work of the editors is beholden to the viewpoints of more “reliable” individuals and
organizations. Because the site reflects mainstream views on issues, it may not be the best
venue for disrupting dominant perspectives and challenging established beliefs. At the
same time, however, Wikipedia does subvert certain cultural assumptions about
credibility. As Timothy Messer-Kruse notes about his frustrations revising an entry on
the Haymarket riot and trial, “I’ve written two books and a couple of articles about the
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episode. In some circles that affords me a presumption of expertise on the subject. Not,
however, on Wikipedia.” While I don’t advocate for a repudiation of a professor’s life’s
work—especially when it challenges dominant assumptions of a cultural event—this
episode makes me wonder how Wikipedia editors perceive and negotiate their actions,
especially when they relate to incorporating, revising, or refuting information that
challenges the status quo.
Entries may need to be based on reliable sources and not give “undue weight” to
an issue, but I’m curious whether Wikipedia editors can work within these policies and
still subtly disrupt assumptions. I’m not calling for editors to knowingly misrepresent
another person’s ideas, but there seems to be the opportunity to generate divergent effects
through the recomposition of reliable source information. As I argued in the previous
chapter, something as seemingly simple as Glenn Kessler’s entry being located within the
“Conservative commentators” section of the “You didn’t build that” Wikipedia page can
be destabilizing. Is it possible to make such a move strategically, regardless of the page in
question? Can an editor remain faithful to a reliable source but present that information in
a way that manages to disrupt dominant narratives?
Pursuing answers to these questions could certainly be taken up by investigations
into Wikipedia’s revision histories and talk pages (as I noted in the previous chapter), but
it may also be productive to bring editors into future research. In “Through the Eyes of
Researchers,” Kevin DePew argues that textual analysis, while valuable, privileges the
scholar’s interpretation of a text (51). In order to partially offset the influence of what
Haraway refers to as the “god-trick,” DePew urges digital researchers to incorporate the
individuals engaged in online discourse in order to triangulate research (54-5). He argues
75

that by “talking to rhetors and audiences about their rhetorical experiences with digital
texts” we can better understand how these individuals conceptualize their actions and the
choices they make (67). By then pairing this with our own analyses, we can come to a
more complex understanding of the rhetorical activity of a particular space. In terms of
expanding this project, interviewing and getting first-hand accounts from Wikipedia
editors about how they conceptualize their work and the nuances in how they
(re)compose information would likely be productive. After all, even if editors don’t see
their work in terms of activism or intervention, it’s possible that such research could still
reveal opportunities for subtle disruptions.
While I’ve situated this example in terms of Wikipedia, the implications of this
future research could extend beyond that particular site to other places and spaces where
individuals draw from the work of others to effect change. The point of strategic
interactions isn’t to change a person’s mind wholesale or collapse a system, because
every opinion, every argument, every action—even the seemingly inconsequential—
generates an ongoing rippling of effects. All the same, it’s important to note that
nonlinear, compensatory effects may be, at times, inadequate, especially when a person’s
lived reality is adversely affected by certain beliefs and actions. Similarly, the various
systems we construct and the individuals who comprise them may seem inaccessible.
However, as I’ve hoped to express in this thesis, we are connected in complex, myriad
ways and are together involved in various unfoldings. And in this is an appreciation for
the ever-present potential for things to be and to become otherwise, even if it occurs
beyond our understanding.
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